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A bstract
User interfaces that employ the same display and buttons may look the same but 
can work very differently depending on how they are implemented. In healthcare, 
it is critical that interfaces that look the same are the same. Hospitals typically 
have many types of visually similar infusion pumps, but with different software 
versions and variation between pump behaviour, and this may lead to unexpected 
adverse events. For example, when entering drug doses into two similar infusion 
pumps, different results may arise when pushing identical sequences of buttons. 
These differences arise as a result of subtle implementation differences and may lead 
to large errors that users do not notice.
“Differential formal analysis” is a new user interface analytic evaluation method 
based on stochastic user simulation. The method is particularly valuable for helping 
evaluate safety critical user interfaces, which often have subtle programming issues. 
This new approach starts with the identification of operational design features that 
define the design space to be explored. All combinations of design features are 
analysed by simulating keystroke sequences containing keying slip errors. Finally, 
each simulation produces numerical values that rank the design combinations on the 
basis of their sensitivity to key slip errors.
Differential formal analysis is demonstrated through case studies of number entry 
systems, many of which represent a common safety-critical user interface styles found 
in medical infusion pumps and elsewhere. The results uncover critical design issues, 
and are an important contribution of this thesis since the results provide device 
manufacturers guidelines to improve their device firmware.
The analysis is complemented with models of usage based on 1,362 days of use of 
number entry systems from 19 infusion pumps over a 3 year period in a UK hospital. 
This thesis also suggests some improvements to medical device logging, which will 
help further evidence-based improvement to medical device safety.
Previously, empirical methods and analytic methods have been used indepen­
dently to analyse and improve number entry system designs. This thesis identifies 
key contrasts in exploring number entry errors using laboratory studies and analytic 
methods. The implications of combining methods to more thoroughly analyse safety 
critical design are discussed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The aim of medical care is to improve people’s health, and this is pursued with 
great success today. Unfortunately, however, medical care also entails injuries to 
certain patients, which in some cases have fatal results. Some of these injuries are 
expected side-effects of medicines and treatment. They are usually accepted since 
the benefits of medicines and treatments are more substantial than the injuries they 
cause to patients.
Incorrect drug doses and incorrect drug dose calculations are a significant con­
tributory factor in unnecessary fatalities in healthcare. There are many papers on 
the prevalence of prescribing errors (Dean et al., 2002), but very few on user in­
teraction errors, since interaction errors are harder to measure as they generally do 
not leave a paper record that can be easily analysed. Vicente et al. (2003) estimate 
the probability of fatal number-entry errors on Patient Controlled Analgesia (PCA) 
pumps (ones controlling pain, typically delivering opiates) as between 1 in 33,000 
to 1 in 338,800 (the large uncertainty is due to estimating reporting rates — many 
errors are not reported); or in absolute terms approximately 65-667 per year in the 
US or (scaling by population) 155-1,587 per year in Europe. Vicente et al. (2003) 
warn that these are low estimates as they are based on fatalities in the US but 
the PCA pump is used worldwide, and hence the denominator used, the number of 
pumps sold, would have been too high. By way of comparison, the probability of 
death from general anaesthesia is approximately 1 in 200,000-300,000.
This thesis argues that devices are at least partly to blame for the 9,800 deaths
3
per year caused by calculation errors. So far, little research has been carried out 
into how to design medical devices to reduce this death rate.
1.1 A case for medical HCI
The Institute of Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) Canada has issued a report of 
an incident that lead to the death of a 43 year old cancer patient (Institute of Safe 
Medication Practices Canada, 2007). The ISMP Canada reports that the determined 
cause of death was “sequelae of fluorouracil toxicity” . The patient received a dose of 
flourouracil that was intended to be administered in four days over four hours. The 
medication incident was recognised an hour after the infusion was completed but 
injuries caused by the overdose lead to multiple organ failure and the patient’s death.
Following this incident, the ISMP Canada carried out a root cause analysis that 
is reported in (Institute of Safe Medication Practices Canada, 2007). As part of the 
root cause analysis, a study was carried out with five nurses from the same cancer 
care centre where the incident occurred. The five nurses were asked to perform the 
same task that caused the medication incident that lead to the death of the patient. 
This short study with five nurses found that:
• Three out of five nurses entered incorrect data
• All five nurses were confused by the setup, or the selection of mL/hr
• Two out of five nurses were confused by programming the device to administer 
the drug dose
• Three out of five nurses were confused by how the decimal point works on 
the device
The results from this study show that running a short study with 5 nurses is 
useful for finding out problems with medical device design. This thesis argues that 
usability concerns related to medical device use should be addressed before medical 
devices are put on the market. Better pre-market medical device evaluation can 
prevent incidents such as the one described in this section.
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Figure 1.1: A BBraun Infusomat Space pump; a widely used drug infusion pump
Figure 1.2: A Zimed AD pump
1.2 A typical m edical device problem
Two infusion pumps from two international, world leading manufacturers were anal­
ysed. A BBraun Infusomat Space seen in figure 1.1 and a Zimed AD seen in figure 
1.2. Infusion pumps are ubiquitous devices in hospitals that are used to infuse drugs, 
nutrition and fluids intravenously. Infusing too much of a substance is likely to cause 
cause harm or death, while infusing too little can leave patients untreated, which 
may also be harmful.
Both the BBraun Infusomat Space and Zimed AD allow clinicians to enter doses 
using a 5-key number entering system as seen in figure 1.3. A 5-Key interface has a 
display and 5 number entry buttons. On the display there is a cursor that highlights 
a digit and the [ a | ▼ | buttons change the highlighted digit. The j V| ► | buttons 
move the cursor between digits and the |0K| button confirms the input number. 
The work for this thesis was motivated by an observation of entering the dose
5
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Figure 1.3: A 5-Key interface with a cursor highlighting a digit. In this system, A | 
and ▼ | buttons manipulate the highlighted digit, <  J (_►_) buttons move the cursor 
between digits, and the QK| button confirms the number.
K ey P ress Zim ed AD B B rau n  Infusom at Space
V I_
T J
Ij l I
ijLl
ijLJ
i j l I m m m
Ll I m j l H I M
Figure 1.4: A key sequence being input into Zimed AD and BBraun Infusomat Space  
from the sam e key sequence. This table shows the change in displays after pressing 
the key in the “Key Press” column. In th e  first row there is no key press to  show the  
starting displays o f  the two devices.
of 950 mL into the  B B raun Infusom at Space and Zimed AD devices s ta rtin g  from 
the same screen and using the  same key presses on bo th  devices. From a display 
showing on bo th  devices (where the  underline indicates the digit highlighted by 
the cursor), pressing the  plausible key sequence { < | a |:) a  | ▼ | on the  BBraun 
Infusom at Space and Zimed AD sim ultaneously resulted in the Zimed AD display 
showing t o a f  a t the end of the  key sequence and the  B Braun Infusom at Space 
showing ■ » m w  This behaviour is illustrated  in figure 1.4 w hat shows how the 
displays of bo th  devices change when each of the keys are pressed.
S tarting  from K*H on bo th  devices, bo th  devices work in the same way until the 
final key press of 1 ▼ j. This is where the two num ber entry systems are im plem ented 
to  do different things th a t result in the different values. There is a significant
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difference in results between the two devices and implemented in medical infusion 
pumps, this difference could be harmful, or even fatal.
Chapter 4 details why the two 5-key number entry systems on the BBraun In­
fusomat Space and the Zimed AD work differently There are interaction design 
decisions about how 5-key number entry systems are implemented in program code. 
Chapter 4 shows that there are at least 28 different ways of implementing 5-key 
number entry systems. In medical devices, it is important that all devices are stan­
dardised to implement one of these possible interaction designs.
The problem is larger than 5-key implementations working differently between 
different devices by different manufactures. The 5-key implementation of the device 
is implemented in the device firmware and the manufacturers upgrade firmware. 
Analysing the 5-key number entry system of different firmware versions of one of 
the commercial infusion pumps, resulted that the firmware upgrade changed the 
5-key number entry system implementation. This results in devices that look iden­
tical and work differently. In a hospital, since devices are in use by patients, the 
device upgrade process is gradual. It happens that devices that look identical, work 
differently because of the firmware version installed. Nurses are overworked, and 
hospital wards are very busy (R. J. Koppel & Gordon, 2012), having different im­
plementations of 5-key number entry systems can lead to unnecessary incidents that 
can be fatal.
Under the UK Health h  Safety At Work Act (1974) and under similar legislation 
in other countries, devices should be designed to reduce risk to be As Low As 
Reasonably Practical, ALARP. This work shows that the details in medical device 
design, such as how to implement the safety critical number entry system to enter 
doses on a device, are often overlooked and they are not implemented to reduce risk 
to the legal requirements of the ALARP principle. This thesis shows that choosing 
the best design over the worst design out of the 28 possible implementations of 5- 
key number entry systems reduces the harm caused by human error eight-fold. It is 
important that the best design is implemented, rather than the worst.
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1.3 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is a new analytical analysis method: Differential 
Formal Analysis. Choosing the best implementation of a 5-key interface is difficult 
to do using lab studies, specifically because number entry error rates are not high 
enough to obtain significant results of which of the designs (with subtle differences) 
is best. In a study of 20 participants carried out by Oladimeji et al. (2013) to find 
out what speed/accuracy tradeoffs there are between interfaces of different button 
layouts, no participants confirmed erroneous numbers on the 5-key interface. This 
shows that it would be very time consuming to carry out human experiments to study 
subtle programming differences in one button layout and obtain significant results.
Differential Formal Analysis is a stochastic simulation based method that is ca­
pable of generating millions of number entry tasks and results are significant. One 
of the strongest benefits of Differential Formal Analysis is that it raises important 
discussions and very good empirical questions that would not arise without going 
through the Differential Formal Analysis process. For some empirical questions 
raised, the Differential Formal Analysis method can be used to determine whether 
the results of the empirical question are important or not i.e. whether they will 
change the results from the Differential Formal Analysis. If the results of the empir­
ical experiment matter, investing time and money in the experiment is worthwhile 
depending on whether the question is of value to research or marketing a device.
This thesis shows how empirical and analytic techniques can be used together 
to improve medical device design. Logs from medical infusion pumps are analysed 
to answer questions about what digit distributions are used in medical devices; how 
users input numbers; and more.
Finally, this thesis compares and contrasts between using a lab study approach 
and the analytic approach introduced in this thesis. It discusses the importance of 
triangulating the two approaches for designing safety critical number entry systems.
1.4 Thesis overview
An overview of the rest of this thesis is described in this section, highlighting the 
contributions of each chapter.
Chapter 2: Background -  This chapter provides a background to this thesis. 
It gives a background into human error; an account of the current European 
and American regulations, standards and guidance on medical device design 
and highlights the HCI techniques used in industry. A description of current 
HCI techniques used to manufacture medical device design is detailed, and a 
description of how this thesis contributes to the current manufacturing pro­
cess is given. Finally, the current state of the art of number entry research 
is described.
Chapter 3: The Differential Formal A nalysis M ethod -  This chapter 
introduces a novel analysis method for analysing safety critical user interface 
implementations. The Differential Formal Analysis process is described, and 
the core method used throughout this thesis, Stochastic Key Slip Simulation 
(SKSS) is detailed.
Chapter 4: Differential Formal Analysis Case Study — 5-Key N um ­
ber Entry -  This chapter makes a case for safety critical 5-key number entry 
design. 5-Key number entry is analysed as a case study of Differential For­
mal Analysis using SKSS. Implementation details of the SKSS method are 
described and finally, results for 5-key number entry are presented.
Chapter 5: Em pirically informed SKSS for m edical device design
-  This thesis goes on to describe how the SKSS method can be empirically 
informed to tailor an analysis to a domain, in this case, medical devices. Med­
ical device logs from 19 infusion pumps used in a UK hospital over the period 
of three years are analysed to retrieve empirical parameters to be used in the 
SKSS method. An empirically informed SKSS analysis is carried out on 5-key 
number entry systems and results are presented and compared to the generic 
results that were previously presented in Chapter 4.
9
Chapter 6: Triangulating Stochastic K ey Slip Simulation and Empir­
ical Techniques -  This chapter extends the previous implementation of SKSS 
to a tool that accepts a description of a number entry system in JavaScript 
Object Notation. Three number entry systems that were previously studied 
by Oladimeji et al. (2013) in a lab study are analysed using SKSS. The results 
from the SKSS analysis are discussed in relation to the results in (Oladimeji et 
al., 2013) and an argument for triangulating analytic and empirical techniques 
is made for safety critical number entry design.
Chapter 7: Conclusions Sz further work -  This chapter summarises this 
thesis, outlines further work and makes concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Background
This thesis is about providing evidence — for number entry systems in medical 
devices — to show that they are designed to cause the least possible harm in the 
presence of human error. This chapter discusses a background into: human error; 
the regulations and standards enforced for the manufacturing and marketing of 
medical infusion pumps; a broad view into usability and HCI and a description of 
how sufficient safety evidence is lacking in currently employed methods; a description 
of relevant empirical and theoretical work about number entry system design.
2.1 Human error
Incorrect actions by the user, i.e. human errors, are important to deal with in 
improving safety. Much work has been devoted to defining and classifying human 
error. A classic definition is given by Reason (1990): human error is a generic 
term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or 
physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures 
cannot be attributed to some chance agency. Reason (1990) subdivides human error 
with the aid of the Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) and according to this 
subdivision, an incorrect action is one of the following:
• Slip
• Lapse
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• Rule-based mistake
•  Knowledge m istake
•  V iolation
Reason (1990) makes a distinction between active failure (active error) and la ten t 
condition (la ten t error). Active failures are the direct errors com m itted by people 
in a system , while la ten t conditions are existing defects in the system  such as poor 
design and deficient train ing  th a t, when com bined w ith local circum stances, can 
result in exposure to hazard. These defects may he la tent for a long tim e w ithou t 
any harm  arising: hence the term . Latent conditions can also increase the probability  
of active failure by creating local factors th a t prom ote error. The hum an errors th a t 
have been considered in this thesis are of the active failure type.
R eason’s Swiss Cheese model (Reason, I I 21), is widely accepted in healthcare. 
It illustrates system s as stacked slices of swiss cheese where each slice of cheese is 
a layer of defence against an incident occurring. Figure 2.1 shows th a t each layer 
of defence is not perfect and it has holes th a t could let an incident go through th a t 
layer. If an incident happens to  go through the holes of each layer of defence, the  
incident happens. The model clearly illustrates th a t it is only when the holes in the  
swiss cheese model line up th a t an incident occurs.
Figure 2.1: T he swiss cheese  model illustrates that when the holes in the levels o f  
defence line up, accidents go through.
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In healthcare, clinicians are largely considered as the last layer of defence. In­
cident investigations are focused on nurses rather than on the larger system, such 
as in the widely reported cases the nurse Kimberly Hyatt who was suspended for a 
dosing error (Ostrom, 2011) and Denise Melanson, who was a cancer patient who 
died because of the lack of usability studies on the infusion pump used in her therapy 
(Institute of Safe Medication Practices Canada, 2007).
This thesis argues that in safety critical drug dose input, the last layer of defence 
is not the nurse — it is the medical device. In the case of the cancer patient fatality 
described in chapter 1, the nurse who administered the drug is not the last layer of 
defence. The device could have been designed better to prevent the fatal error from 
occurring. This thesis shows that like all layers of defence, the medical device also 
has holes in it. Improving number entry design will not lead to no number entry 
errors. The aim, using the swiss cheese analogy, is to make some holes in the swiss 
cheese slice smaller.
Two techniques that help in designing devices to prevent human error are Sys­
tematic Human-Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) (Stanton, 
2003) and Task Analysis For Error Identification (TAFEI) (Stanton Sz Baber, 2005). 
Both SHERPA and TAFEI aim to improve device design by preventing errors from 
occurring in the design of the system and they have been used to reduce errors when 
withdrawing cash from automatic teller machines (Burford, 1993), recalling a phone 
number on mobile phones (Baber Sz Stanton, 2001), buying a ticket on the ticket 
machines on the London Underground (Baber & Stanton, 1996), operating high- 
voltage switchgear in substations (Glendon, Clarke, & McKenna, 2006), medical 
applications (Yamaoka Sz Baber, 2000) and more.
SHERPA (Stanton, 2003) is a method used to determine possible error modes in 
the device. A Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) (Annett, 2003) is used to represent 
task performance in terms of goals, operations and plans. To apply SHERPA, each 
task step is classified as either: action; retrieval; checking; information communica­
tion; or selection. After this classification has been carried out, the analyst considers 
credible error modes associated with that activity. The errors are described in terms 
of the consequence in order to determine how critical they are. One of the prob­
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lems with the SHERPA method, identified in (Stanton, 2003), is that novice users 
over predict errors. TAFEI aims at predicting errors that can occur by comparing 
normative behaviour with possible transitions of the state of a device, this makes it 
less likely to generate false alarms than SHERPA.
TAFEI (Stanton Sz Baber, 2005) attempts to predict errors with device use by 
modelling the interaction between user and device. In the TAFEI method, a hierar­
chical task analysis (HTA) is performed to model the human side of the interaction, 
then a state-space diagram (SSD) is drawn up to describe the device model. Plans 
from the HTA are mapped onto the SSD and finally, a transition matrix is drawn 
up to display state transitions when the device is used. The aim of TAFEI is to 
highlight state transitions that are possible but undesirable. TAFEI’s use in design 
is to help design devices that make the possible undesirable actions impossible in 
the device design.
SHERPA and TAFEI improve device design by redesigning systems such that 
possible human interactions do not lead to erroneous states. When considering 
number entry in medical devices, it is difficult to predict which number entry states 
are erroneous or not. In a device where the possible inputs are 0 -  99999 any input 
can be valid for specific goals therefore preventing a particular state from occurring 
(in this case, a particular number) is not the way to improve number entry design. 
This thesis presents an approach to reduce the severity of number entry errors by 
simulating number entry tasks, simulating possible errors and measuring the severity 
of errors. A number entry design is chosen based on which design is predicted to 
lead to the least number of severe errors.
2.1.1 “O ut by r ”  error d efin ition
In healthcare, giving a patient ten times too much (or too little) of a drug is almost 
always a critical error regardless of the drug involved. This is often called an out 
by ten error. More generally, if the number a user enters e is at least r (r > 1) 
times higher or lower than the intended number, this is called an “out by r ” error. 
For example, the user entering (at least) 100 when 10 was expected or (at most) 10 
when 100 was expected has made an out by 10 error. Of course, entering 100 or
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more in error when intending 10 may have made an out by 11, out by 20, etc, error, 
which would be worse than “just” an out by 10 error. In general any out by x error 
is also an out by y error if x  > y. In this thesis, out by r  error is commonly referred 
to in order to describe error magnitudes.
2.2 Regulation and standards
Medical device manufacturers go through regulation processes to legally sell their 
devices in various countries. This section describes the processes that medical device 
manufacturers go through to be able to legally market and sell their devices in the 
Europe Union (EU) and the United States (US).
2.2.1 E U  leg isla tion
To market and sell a product in the European Economic Area (EEA), the European 
Commission requires that manufacturers get CE Marking (European Commission, 
2013) for their device. The CE Mark is a declaration by the manufacturer that the 
device conforms to EU legislation and that the manufacturer assumes full responsi­
bility for that conformity. The CE Marking process involves:
1. Deciding which EU Directives are applicable for the product
2. Ensuring that the product is applicable with the relevant Directives by testing 
and applying the relevant conformity assessment procedures
3. Compiling and retaining a technical file that satisfies the requirements of the 
Directives
4. Writing and signing the Declaration of Conformity and keeping the original 
with the technical file
5. Applying CE Marking to the equipment in accordance with the requirements 
of the Directives
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EU Directives require that manufacturers certify that they have followed stan­
dards to manufacture their product. In regards to medical infusion pumps md 
interaction design, manufacturers are required to follow the usability standard EN 
ISO 62366:2008 Medical devices - Application of usability engineering to medcal 
devices (BS EN, 2008).
As discussed in chapter 1, under the UK Health & Safety At Work Act (1974), 
it is required that safety critical and dependable applications should abide by the 
ALARP principle. This requires that medical device manufacturers use methods 
and tools to provide evidence that their devices abide by this principle.
2.2 .2  U S  leg isla tion
The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates medical de­
vices that are to be sold in the United States. Medical devices that are simlar 
to others that are FDA approved, are regulated through the FDA’s 510k preirar- 
ket notification process (US FDA, 2013). Infusion pumps manufacturers use :he 
510k premarket notification process since the the type of device (infusion punp) 
has already been approved.
In a letter to infusion pump manufacturers (Shuren, 2010), the FDA writes:
FDA has seen an increase in the number and severity o f infusion pump recalls. 
Analyses o f Medical Device Reports (M DRs) have revealed device problems 
that appear to  be a result o f  faulty design. Between January 1, 2005 and 
Decem ber 31, 2009, FDA received over 56 ,000  MDRs associated with the 
use o f infusion pumps. O f these reports, approximately 1% were reported 
as deaths, 34% were reported as serious injuries, and 62% were reported as 
malfunctions.
T he m ost frequently reported infusion pump device problems are: software 
error m essages, human factors (which include, but are not limited to, use 
error), broken com ponents, battery failure, alarm failure, over infusion and 
under infusion. In som e reports, the manufacturer was unable to  determine 
or identify the problem and reported the problem as “unknown." Subse-
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quent root cause analyses revealed that many of these design problems were 
foreseeable and, therefore, preventable.
The 510k process involves submitting the required documentation for device 
review. The documentation includes proof that the device is substantially similar 
to a device that is legally marketed in the US, and that the manufacturing process 
followed the relevant FDA guidance documents and standards.
After the forms are submitted by a company, the documentation is reviewed by 
the relevant FDA department and manufacturers are notified in approximately 90 
days. Manufacturers can question the guidance documents and relevant standards 
and use a process that is fit for the device they are manufacturing, however, this 
would considerably delay the approval process.
In the case of infusion pumps, manufacturers are required to demonstrate (through 
documentation) that they have followed medical devices design standards such as 
the standard, ISO 62366:2008 Medical devices - Application of usability engineering 
to medical devices (BS EN, 2008).
The ISO 62366:2008 standard includes usability engineering processes from Nielsen 
(1994) applied to medical devices, risk management, and usability validation. The 
processes described in the standard are processes that have been used in desktop ap­
plication development since Nielsen (1994) and Norman (2002) made them popular 
for the success of desktop application software companies.
These processes outlined in the relevant standards were not developed with 
the intention of safety critical design in hospital scenarios but rather, for the de­
velopment of desktop application software used in homes and offices. The HCI 
stancards used in the medical device design processes are therefore not design 
with safety in mind.
This thesis aims at developing methods to provide evidence that should be used in 
process of medical device design and regulation. The method for providing evidence 
in this thesis is designed for safety critical medical device interaction design, making 
it important to include in the current manufacturing processes and regulation.
Ii relation to infusion pumps, the FDA has a Generic Infusion Pump project 
(Arney, Jetley, & Jones, 2007) where the aim is to develop a set of safety models
17
that manufacturers can employ in their infusion pump manufacturing process. These 
models can be used as a safety reference standard to verify safety properties in 
various classes of infusion pumps. The Generic Infusion pump was designed following 
a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis carried out by Y. Zhang, Jones, and 
Jetley (2010).
A risk matrix (NHS National Patient Safety Agency, 2008) is commonly adopted 
in risk analysis in healthcare and aviation. It defines safety as the product of the 
likelihood of occurrence of the risk and the severity of the consequence if that risk 
occurs. In relation to the risk matrix, in this thesis, the risk is human error occurring 
while a practitioner enters a drug does in an infusion pump. The aim of this thesis 
is to reduce the severity of the consequence caused by human error, rather than 
reducing human error itself.
The method presented in this thesis provides evidence that regulatory bodies 
should require for pre-market approval.
2.3 Usability and HCI
The medical device usability standard, ISO 62366:2008 refers to the most commonly 
employed usability standard, ISO 9242-11:1998 for guidance on the usability engi­
neering process. ISO 9242-11:1998 defines usability as “The effectiveness, efficiency, 
and satisfaction with which specified users achieve specified goals in particular en­
vironments.” The components are explained as follows:
• Effectiveness -  The accuracy and completeness with which specified users can 
achieve specified goals in particular environments.
•  Efficiency -  The resources expended in relation to the accuracy and complete­
ness of goals achieved.
• Satisfaction -  The comfort and the acceptability of the work system to its 
users and other people affected by its use.
The HCI methods advised in usability standards are based on well established 
literature in HCI, among which is Nielsen’s Usability Engineering (Nielsen, 1994),
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Norman’s The Design of Everyday Things (Norman, 2002) and Shneiderman’s De­
signing the User Interface (Shneiderman, Plaisant, Cohen, h  Jacobs, 2013).
Nielsen, Norman and Shneiderman give user interface design principles for de­
signing applications. While these principles are very useful for designing commercial 
systems (like word processors), arguably, they were not conceived or written for de­
signing safety critical user interfaces.
One of Nielsen’s usability heuristics is about “error prevention”. Nielsen (1994) 
suggests that when designing for error prevention, clear, understandable error mes­
sages should be displayed to the user when an error occurs. Nielsen goes on to 
discuss that even better than error prevention, designers should either eliminate er­
ror prone conditions or check for then and present users with a confirmation option 
before committing to the action.
In medical scenarios, eliminating error is not always possible. Consider infusion 
pumps as an example, the value of a drug being entered can have a wide range of 
possible valid values. Nurses care about patients and their intentions are to help 
and care for patients, however, nurses are overworked and often sleep deprived, 
and often find themselves doing safety critical tasks in less than ideal conditions 
(R. J. Koppel & Gordon, 2012). Barcodes have been used to prevent nurses from 
entering drug dose values themselves, however barcodes bring about a new set of 
safety critical problems as described in (R. Koppel et al., 2008). Among some of 
the problems: barcodes get pealed and broken, making them impossible to scan; 
barcodes go missing; and more.
In the book Usability Engineering (Nielsen, 1994), Nielsen describes that er­
ror should be prevented however, there are no mathematical engineering methods 
presented on how to to prevent (or reduce) error.
Shneiderman’s rules (Shneiderman et al., 2013) also describe that systems should 
have simple and understandable error handling. Like Nielsen (1994) the guideline 
is for designing to prevent error and to provide useful error messages.
In ISO 9242-11:1998 there is a focus on iterative design (Nielsen, 1993). The 
iterative design process is commonly used in HCI since it allows designers to iden­
tify usability problems. The method involves developing a prototype of the user
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interface of a system, giving it to users to use it, noting any issues with the de­
sign then refining the user interface design based on what was learnt by obsening 
users using the system.
When applied to safety critical systems such as entering drug doses into medcal 
infusion pumps, one of the main aims of the user interface design is to design the 
system to prevent users from entering wrong values. In an iterative design proc3ss, 
a number entry system is developed and people are observed using it. The nunber 
entry system is then refined to design a number entry interface that reduces the 
number of errors that users make. Through this iterative process, number entry er­
rors are significantly reduced after several iterations user interface design refinemmt, 
possibly bringing errors down to zero.
In the ideal situation where iterative design reduces number entry error to bang 
undetectable in user trails, human error will still occur in hospitals when medcal 
devices are used for longer periods of time. It is infeasible to run well desigied 
user trials that are long enough to detect human error in number entry systems 
that are refined to reduce the likelihood of human error occurring. At this stige 
in design, analytic methods are useful to further refine number entry systems to 
reduce the harm caused by human error. In safety critical systems such as medcal 
infusion pumps, it is worthwhile reducing harm regardless of how many fataliiies 
are prevented.
2.4 Empirical studies for number entry system  
design
Azenkot, Bennett, and Ladner (2013) present a longitudinal evaluation of the Dgi- 
Taps system. DigiTaps is presented as an eyes-free interaction system with mininal 
audio feedback for touchscreen devices. The study by Azenkot et al. (2013) is in­
tended for text entry by blind people and although it presents results on accuracy, 
it does not mention how big the errors made by the participants are. The system 
is not intended for use as a safety critical number entry system, rather as a system 
for blind people to enter numbers into their mobile devices.
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Hesselmann, Heuten, and Boll (2011) present a technique for entering numbers 
into interactive muti-touch tabletop devices using 10 fingers and both hands. The 
method for number entry in the Tap2Count system by Hesselmann et al. (2011) 
is to  tap the number of fingers for each digit on a tabletop so for example, if the 
digit 8 is to be input, all the fingers from one hand and three fingers from the other 
hand are to be tapped. The evaluation and discussion by Hesselmann et al. (2011) 
focusses on how well participants understand the system and whether they like it. 
This initial evaluation of 12 users showed no errors in this system.
Martin, Clark, Morgan, Crowe, and Murphy (2012) take a user-centred approach 
to requirements elicitation in medical device design, using a medical imaging device 
as a case study. The method of this research consisted of a brainstorming session 
with the device development team, interviews with potential users, data analysis 
from the previous two stages of the study, feedback of the data analysis to the 
development team and finally, interviews with the development team.
Oladimeji, Thimbleby, and Cox (2011) compare so-called serial and incremental 
number entry interface styles. They used eye tracking, and uncovered important 
design principles (including an explanation of why incremental interfaces are more 
dependable than numeric keypad interfaces for number entry). Chapter 4 in this 
thesis compares compares 5 different design features in up to 28 combinations: this 
scale of comparison complements Oladimeji, Thimbleby, and Cox (2011)’s empirical 
work by targeting subtle variations in interface layouts which previously were all 
classed under a single “incremental” heading.
Oladimeji et al. (2013) carry out a lab study to compare five different styles of 
number entry interfaces (shown in figure 2.2) using the criteria of speed and accu­
racy. The study indicated that error rates in lab experiments are low, and undetected 
error rates (i.e., errors nurses make that they do not notice) are even lower. This 
thesis takes a closer look at number entry systems. Chapter 1 uncovered that num­
ber entry interfaces that have the same hardware layout can be programmatically 
implemented to work differently and this may cause unnecessary harm. The results 
in the lab experiment by Oladimeji et al. (2013) show that the number of errors that 
participants make in lab studies are very low. To evaluate different implementations
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Figure 2.2: Number entry keyboard layouts studied by Oladjimeji et al. (2013). Image  
taken from (Oladjimeji e t  al., 2013).
of the same num ber en try  system, the lab experim ent m ethod used in (O ladim eji et 
ah, 2013) would have to  be run  for a longer time, m aking it im practical for ob ta in ­
ing significant results. This thesis introduces an analytic approach to num ber entry 
system  design to  further investigate how to  design num ber entry  systems to  further 
reduce the harm  caused by hum an error when em pirical trials become im practical.
Medical device logs th a t can be retrieved from devices th a t are currently  used 
in hospitals can be a rich source of em pirical data . Medical device logs have been 
analysed by Lee et al. (2012) and W isem an, Cox, and Brum by (2013). Lee et al.
(2012) present valuable insight into: how infusion pum ps are used in hospitals; how 
we can gain insight into hospital in frastructure; how much it costs for nurses to 
a tten d  to  alarm s over a period of a year; and other interesting findings th a t can 
significantly improve healthcare systems. In the work presented in chapter 5, there  
is a different focus on retrieving inform ation from logs. The concern in this thesis is 
to  use medical device logs to  answer very specific em pirical questions to tailor the 
analytical m ethod (th a t is introduced in th is thesis) to the medical dom ain ra ther 
th an  to  com pare or discuss issues found by Lee et al. (2012).
W isem an, Cox, and Brum by (2013) analysed logs from an infusion pum p w ith  a 
num eric keypad design. W isem an, Cox, and Brum by (2013) found th a t the num bers 
used in medical scenarios are not uniform ly d istributed , bu t some digits are more 
com mon than  others. In chapter 5, a sim ilar study  to W isem an, Cox, and Brum by
(2013) is carried out on logs from an infusion pum p w ith a 5-key num ber entry  
system. Further log analysis is carried out in th is thesis to  discuss: how m edical 
practitioners enter num bers; noticed error; and more.
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2.5 M athem atical techniques in number entry sys­
tem  design
Safety critical work in software verification of safety-critical systems is a rich area. 
This area focuses on making sure that the safety critical programs do what they say 
th a t they are going to do. Techniques such as model checking (Clarke Jr., Grumberg, 
& Peled, 1999) and theorem proving (de Moura et al., 2004) are well established in 
safety critical implementations and have been used for several years.
There are automatic tools that help in the verification of these programs. The 
tools take two inputs: a mathematical model of the program to be verified; and a 
description of the property to be verified -  generally in a formal logic. The verifi­
cation tool then either verifies that the property is guaranteed to be true in every 
trace of the program model or says that the property does not hold everywhere. 
Some tools such as Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) (de Moura et al., 2004) 
and Prototype Verification System (PVS) (Shankar, 1996) give a counterexample of 
how the property does not hold, by means of a program trace (i.e. a trace in the 
model) that falsifies the property.
For correct verification of programs, the program to be verified has to be correctly 
represented in the input format of the automatic verification tool. For program 
verification to be successful, the program being verified is to be modelled correctly, 
and the properties being verified should be specified correctly and they should also 
be properties that we want to verify. Methods such as model checking and theorem 
proving do not make any conclusions about whether the properties being verified are 
properties that are required in a system. In the case of designing medical devices, an 
important research question is what properties do we want to verify using automatic 
verification tools?
Masci, Ruksenas et al. have used model checking and theorem proving to ver­
ify properties about safety critical user interface design (Masci et al., 2011; Masci, 
Ruksenas, et al., 2013). In (Masci et al., 2011) and (Masci, Ruksenas, et al., 2013), 
the number entry system of two infusion pumps are modelled and they are math­
ematically compared to a model of a number entry system that is 'predictable \ by
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the definition given by Masci, Ruksenas, et al. (2013).
The benefit of the work in (Masci et al., 2011; Masci, Ruksenas, et al., 2013) is 
that the automatic verification tool used do not only inform whether the properties 
being verified are true or not within a system. When a property that is being verified 
does not hold in the system, SAL and PVS provide a program trace to describe how 
the system does not satisfy the property. This is useful for discussing whether the 
program should satisfy the property in that trace or for changing to program to 
satisfy the property.
The work presented in this thesis complements the formal work by Masci, Ruksenas, 
et al. (2013). Prom a formal methods perspective, the analytic method introduced 
in this thesis can be used to find out what properties should be verified using the 
mathematical tools, SAL and PVS. Therefore, the outcomes of the analytic method 
presented in this work are a set of properties that existing mathematical tools can 
verify about number entry systems.
Thimbleby makes an analytic argument against using seven segment displays 
in (Thimbleby, 2013b). Seven segment displays are ubiquitous in everyday devices 
and they are also common in commerical medical devices, such as the Graseby 500 
infusion pump. Thimbleby highlights the problems with seven segment displays and 
makes several analytic arguments against using them. Among other problems, there 
are practical issues with the visibility and legibility of numbers on seven segment 
displays. Thimbleby argues that when faults occur with the LEDs of the displays, 
they can display a different number, for example 8 and 3.
2.6 Conclusions
The United States and in European Union have regulations in place for manufactur­
ers to sell their devices in the relevant countries. This chapter presented the current 
state of some regulation, standards and guidance provided by the relevant regulation 
bodies. In regards the HCI and Usability, these regulations enforce standards such 
as ISO 62366 and ISO 9242. Most HCI principles used in these standards are based 
on Nielsen (1994), Norman (2002) and Shneiderman et al. (2013), and as highlighted
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in this chapter, they are not intended for safety critical design.
HCI research so far has focussed on users want and like rather than what they 
need in terms of safety. Safety critical HCI focuses on tradeoffs between usability, 
safety and design. In safety critical scenarios safety should be prioritised over how 
much the users of the devices like the user interface. In safety critical systems, usabil­
ity should focus on balancing these three factors, as described by Oladimeji (2012):
• U sability  -  The users understanding how to perform tasks and making sure 
that the intended user group know how to perform the safety critical task. 
Usability also refers to properties that make the system more pleasant to use.
• Safety -  This refers to allowing error detection in the interface, checking 
for syntax errors when the safety critical system requires input and making 
sure that the error caused by a small interaction does not cause potential of 
great harm.
• D esign -  This refers to the physical design of the device. The shape, button 
layout, space requirements, range of inputs covered and the precision of input.
In a medical scenario, if a safety feature is unusable it could do more harm than 
good. Under time pressure, being unable to set a device because the feature is 
unintelligible could be fatal.
Prom these three factors that are important for safety critical HCI, the current 
study methods available focus on either finding out whether users understand and 
like the device (interaction and form) or measuring speed. So far there are no 
methods for measuring safe interaction design.
One of the aims of safety critical design is to reduce the number of errors that 
occur. In iterative design, a system is developed, evaluated and redesigned (and 
iterate). The redesign should produce less errors than the first, and errors should 
be reduced through each iteration. Systems should be designed to have errors that 
are too few to detect using empirical evaluation techniques. At this point, it is not 
implied that a design will prevent all human error all of the time. Analytic and 
engineering techniques come into play to design systems when empirical techniques 
and design iterations become impractical.
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This thesis presents an analytic analysis approach that aims to reduce harm 
caused by human error. This approach should be used with current research meth­
ods to ensure that users understand the features and perform tasks in required 
time frames. The next chapter presents the theoretical framework for the analytic 
approach for safety critical analysis.
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Chapter 3 
The Differential Formal Analysis 
m ethod
The core method of the thesis is introduced in this chapter. Chapter 4 applies the 
method described here in a case study on 5-key number entry systems and raises 
discussion about the method.
Number entry is required for almost all clinical procedures (e.g., radiation treat­
ment, drug infusion, patient records). Software errors and HCI options can have a 
significant impact on dependability (i.e., the ability of the clinician to successfully 
enter the number intended). We are concerned with quantifying error magnitudes in 
relation to number entry of prescribed values: for example an error that is 1% out 
is less significant than an error that is out by a factor of ten. This is not however 
the only role that numbers can play in a medical context. Numbers are also used 
in healthcare as identifiers such as patient identifiers, and here different techniques 
(such as checksums) should be used — an error of 1%, unless detected, will be a 
completely different patient. An approach beyond the scope of the present work is 
entering numeric values of standard values, which are both identifiers and numeric 
values (e.g. a menu of 10, 20, 50mg).
The method presented here is designed to be useful for studying safety critical, 
numerical interfaces that have subtle differences in implementation. Oladimeji et 
al. (2013) carried out empirical lab studies to find out which number entry interface 
button layout generates less errors, as previously discussed in chapter 2. There are
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statistically significant differences between designs and the best design, the 5-key 
interface is less likely to cause errors than other designs. The number of errors in the 
study (Oladimeji, Thimbleby, & Cox, 2011) are very low. Redesigning the number 
entry interfaces to reduce these error rates would result in lower error rates, however, 
if we bring down error rates to be undetectable in lab studies, number entry errors 
will still occur in hospital scenarios where numbers are entered over a longer period 
of time. After errors are reduced through iterative design, analytical techniques are 
necessary to design safer safety critical number entry systems.
The method presented in this chapter is an analytical approach for finding a num­
ber entry system that causes least harm when human error occurs. The approach 
can be used to study different number entry systems, as studied by Oladimeji et al.
(2013) or to study subtle program implementation differences between designs with 
the same hardware layout. Statistically significant results for the best implementa­
tion can be established in a short time, and the method is customisable for different 
interface styles and different types of users.
3.1 The Differential Formal Analysis process
The Differential Formal Analysis (DFA) process starts by determining optional de­
sign features that are either implemented or not. A design is a combination of 
features, and all the combinations make up the design space. Stochastic Key Slip 
Simulation (SKSS) detailed in Section 3.2, is then used to rank the designs. SKSS 
entails generating a large number of key sequences that take us from one number 
to another and inserting a keying error (substitution, deletion, repetition, or key 
transposition) with probability p per keystroke. If the actual and intended result 
values differ by more than a magnitude k (say, 10), the error is counted; the designs 
are ranked according to the proportion of “out by kn errors.
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3.2 Stochastic key slip simulation (SKSS)
The process is a stochastic simulation where slips are introduced into sequences of 
key presses in interactive number entry systems, to explore the trade-offs arising from 
various choices in the design of such systems, as previously developed by Thimbleby 
and Cairns (2010) for numeric keypad user interfaces.
The basic approach here simulates a human changing the display from one value 
to another, but allowing for — and analysing the sensitivity of the design to — 
human error. The user will make keying slips: repetition (or key bounce); trans­
position (switching two keys in the sequence); deletion (accidentally not pressing 
a key, or the device not registering a key press); substitution (pressing a different 
key than intended). These slips are modelled with some probability p per keystroke 
(which of course may depend on environmental factors), and the proposed designs 
need to be evaluated for the consequences of those slips. Some design features will 
make a design more sensitive to such slips: the more sensitive a design, the more 
likely it is that slips will lead to uncorrected unintended consequences; such sensi­
tivity is best avoided.
It is routine in several safety-critical domains, such as healthcare, to consider 
“out by ten errors,” where the number used is a factor of ten out from the num­
ber intended. This suggests a clear measure of design error sensitivity: namely to 
determine the dependency of out by ten errors on p. This can be achieved by run­
ning simulations.
3.3 Setters, solvers and slip models
A simulation is implemented in terms of solvers, setters, and slip models. Solvers 
and setters occur in matched pairs for each design. A solver generates user key 
sequences that solve the task in question; a slip model inserts slips into key sequences; 
a setter executes key sequences.
For number entry analysis, the task is to change the display from showing some 
number m  to displaying n and entering it to the underlying application (hence, the 
fifth key, [OK|). Thus, each design’s solver is a function that takes two numbers
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m, n and generates a sequence of key presses to change the display from showing 
m  to show n within the constraints of the chosen design, and then submits it by
pressing |OK|. In the special case m  =  n, the solver generates [OK
Different approaches to user modelling are possible: the simplest (conceptually, 
if not in terms of implementation) is to compute the optimal sequence for the given 
task. In reality, users tend to find satisfactory rather than optimal solutions, and 
some truly optimal sequences may be cognitively too hard to determine (Simon, 
1996). Therefore, the approach as used in this work finds the sequence with either 
monotonic left-to-right or right-to-left cursor motion, a realistic satisficing strategy. 
Complementary empirical studies would give better insight into how users enter 
numbers, however this satisficing solver is sufficient for the purpose of demonstrating 
the process.
In contrast, each design’s setter takes an initial value m  and a sequence of 
keystrokes cr, and returns a triple, r =  {rv,rn,re), the result of applying a to the 
system from the starting point m. rv is the actual final value reached, rn is the 
intended/target value, and re is true if an error occurred and was blocked — where 
blocking an error refers to blocking interaction and alerting the user when a user 
action does not result in a change in the display.
Some setters do not block errors under any circumstances (e.g., this is how some 
5-key designs work). No blocked error does not imply rv = n, since ->re means 
no error was blocked by the setter, not that no error occurred — for example, 
slips could occur when a different number is entered ‘correctly’ without triggering a 
blocked error.
A slip m odel generates a sequence of keystrokes with keying slips; specifically, 
given a key sequence a and a probability p, slips (a, p) inserts slips at each keystroke 
of <t, each with independent probability p. The slip model is the way the analysis 
models human error. Then, for some device design d,
setd(m, slips(solved(m, n),p))
“tries” to set the display to n given that it initially shows m. As p increases, this
becomes increasingly unlikely. By using different setters, the idea is to find out which 
combinations of design features make the setter robust against errors introduced as 
a consequence of the slips that the slip model introduces.
3.4 Error sensitivity
Given a design d, a set of probabilities P , and a set T  of task pairs (ra, n), an 
experim ent calculates for each p E P  the set Sdr(p) of results of running the 
appropriate solver, slip model and setter on the various (m, n) pairs:
S<it (p ) — {setd{m, slips (solve d{m,n),p))\ (m ,n ) £ T}
The error sensitivity ed(p) for a design d at p is then:
\{r e  Sdr(p ) : ~^ re A (rv > krn V rv < rn/k)}\
\{r e  SdT(p): ->re}\
Take A; =  10. That is, from each set of samples, the number of non-blocking 
paths that resulted in out-by-ten error are counted and divided by the total number 
of non-blocking paths. Note that valid random values of m  and n are required, 
which may depend on the application.
The error sensitivity of a design may then be investigated, and compared with 
other designs. A better design is less sensitive to error, but since the error sensitivity 
depends (as defined) on p, a simpler measure is the mean gradient ded(p)/dp around 
typical p values (e.g., p «  0.001); in fact, for the case studies, for typical p, sensitivity 
is nearly linear, and hence effectively independent of p. A  lower gradient is better.
Because of linearity, the best design decisions do not depend on the actual value 
of p; it is not necessary to perform experiments to determine p. In an important sense 
the resulting design is more robust — as it does not depend on specific assumptions 
of user performance (as measured by p). Similarly, if the results are established to 
be broadly independent of the mix of slip types, there is no need to model the user 
more realistically.
Chapter 4 demonstrates Differential Formal Analysis using SKSS using 5-key
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number entry. Out-by-ten error is used as the measure of dependability and this is 
particularly relevant to the chosen application of medical number entry.
3.5 Discussion
This work is motivated by the vast interaction differences between implementations 
of number entry systems in popular, commercial medical infusion pumps. The 5- 
key number entry system (see figure 4.1) is gaining popularity in infusion pumps 
from leading manufacturers such as BBraun and Zimed and analysing these pumps 
resulted that the same keying sequences in apparently identical number entry inter­
faces result in very different outcomes.
Consider the case where the starting screen displays MSB and our goal is to 
input a dose of 950 mL; on one commercial pump the key sequence [<~] [ a |5 | < \ 
[ ▼ | results in a display of — but keying in the same sequence starting from
the same state on a different commercial pump results in Figure 3.1 shows
how the user interface of both infusion pumps behaves with each keystroke.
A detailed and formal description of why this happens may be found in (Masci, 
Ruksenas, et al., 2013). The main difference in the case of how the BBraun Infuso- 
mat Space works is that it uses a feature referred to as memory in (Masci, Ruksenas, 
et al., 2013). The memory feature results in unpredictable results (by the definition 
of predictability defined in (Masci, Ruksenas, et al., 2013)) and the paper concluded 
that devices that users perceive to be predictable and reliable should not implement 
the memory feature. Different interaction design choices lead to different values 
on the display (see figure 3.2 for some examples, and the case study in chapter 
4); the aim is finding the best combination of choices (along with their rigorous 
specifications) to make the design more resilient to human error.
The method presented in this chapter does not determine which physical layout 
or button layout is best for a device. If empirically informed, this method can cater 
to the physical aspects of the device. Consider a device that has 5 buttons, if two 
of the buttons are very close to each other while the others are further apart, it is 
possibly more likely for the two buttons that are near to each other to be substituted
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K ey P ress Zim ed A D B B rau n  In fusom at Space
LsJ
La I
La J
La J
La J
La )
LsJ mm
La J
Figure 3.1: A key sequence being input into Zimed AD and BBraun Infusomat Space 
from the same key sequence. This table shows the change in displays after pressing 
the key in the “Key Press” column. In the first row there is no key press to show the 
starting displays of the two devices.
D esign choice P ress D isplay
Arithmetic LaJ
Independent dial La)
Wrap LaJ
No wrap LaJ
Left start P
Right start El
Block underflow LaJ
Underflow & arithmetic LaJ P ^ P
Underflow & independent dial [T J El El
Figure 3.2: Examples of design choices. Note how underflow/blocking and dial/arith­
metic interact. Different interpretations of these and other feature interactions affect 
the sensitivity of the user interface to  user error.
for each other when keying in data. The probabilities of substitution errors for these 
buttons can be manipulated in this method to find out which implementation is safer 
for the device.
3.6 Conclusions
In safety critical domains, analytical techniques should be used with empirical tech­
niques to design safe and accurate interaction. Previous empirical studies have 
shown that error rates from human number entry experiments are very low. To 
obtain statistically significant results when choosing the best implementation of one
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type of number entry interface, empirical techniques are impractical (since millions 
of numbers would need to be entered) and analytical techniques are the way forward 
for this purpose.
Differential formal analysis was introduced in this chapter. To provide rigorous 
support for safety critical design. The SKSS method simulates a user performing 
number entry tasks and simulates slips with a determined probability. The resultant 
value from the task is compared to the intended value and if greater than a set error 
magnitude, k, it should be counted. The design with the least out by k errors is the 
best design.
This method is demonstrated through a case study in chapter 4 where the case 
of 5-Key number entry is used. Chapter 4 details how 5-key number entry sys­
tems should be implemented for safety critical cases. The method raises several 
empirical questions. The Differential Formal Analysis process can be used to deter­
mine whether running the empirical experiments is important or not depending on 
whether the results from the empirical studies change the results from the Differ­
ential Formal Analysis. Examples of how Differential Formal Analysis can be used 
to determine whether or not to run an empirical study are shown in chapter 4 and 
other empirical findings that are determined to be important are used to empirically 
inform the Differential Formal Analysis process in chapter 5.
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Chapter 4 
A Differential Formal Analysis 
case study — 5-key number entry
5-Key number entry interfaces are used in infusion pumps for drug dose entry. This 
type of interface (shown in figure 4.1) has a display that shows the number being 
input and a cursor that highlights a digit that is being edited. Four arrow keys are 
used to edit the number and an [QK | key submits the number.
Two infusion pumps on the market that use 5-key number entry for entering drug 
doses are the Zimed AD and BBraun Infusomat Space pumps shown in figures 4.2 
and 4.3 respectively. Using 5-keys for number entry is attractive to manufacturers 
of medical devices because they are less expensive to manufacture than, say, number 
keypads. The main focus of this thesis is reducing harm caused by number entry 
errors and Oladimeji et al. (2013) show that 5-key interfaces have the least number 
of errors in a study comparing 5 types of number entry hardware layouts.
Oladimeji et al. (2013) use a lab experiment find the best hardware layout of 
a safety critical number entry system and this case study advances that work by 
showing that there are several ways of programming 5-key interfaces and finds the 
best way of programming the number entry interface that produced the best results 
in (Oladimeji et al., 2013). As a case study for the method presented in chapter 3, 
Differential Formal Analysis is applied on 5-key number entry systems to find the 
system that is least sensitive to human error.
This chapter described how Differential Formal Analysis was applied to 5-key
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Figure 4.1: An example o f 5-key user interface layout. Here the cursor is shown in 
the left-m ost position, and the display format is suitable for entering tim es, 0 minutes  
to  999:59 hours. Som e 5-key interfaces omit the OK button as its use can be implied 
by the user performing any action with any non-arrow button.
BRAUN
( ^ P C >  ------ II— 1 3  4-
T Treanda 1100<
j  Volume 5 7 ,82ml ml/h
In fu ttf fia t^ S fp ac e
Figure 4.2: A BBraun Infusomat Space pump; a widely used drug infusion pump
num ber en try  system s and presents results 011 how to  best program  th is type of 
interface. Prim arily, design features of 5-key interfaces are identified and  described, 
then  how differential formal analysis was im plem ented is detailed and finally, results 
are presented. The differential formal analysis raises em pirical questions and  they 
are also discussed in th is chapter. The work in this chapter has been done by myself 
duplicated  and discussed w ith three o ther researchers: Harold Thimbleby, Andy 
G im blett and Paolo Masci for validation. This process makes th is work scientifically 
rigorous and it has been key in im proving num ber entry  design safety.
4.1 D esign features
The design features of 5-key num ber entry  system s were derived by studying  infusion 
pum ps from different m anufacturers. There are im plem entation variations relating 
to  how the  cursor works and how the digits work. These design variations make up 
the design features and are described here.
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000:00
Figure 4.3: A Zimed AD pump
• Left or R igh t S ta r t  In the s ta rting  screen, is the cursor on the  left or on 
the right?
• C u rso r W rap aro u n d  -  W hen the cursor is at a display edge (leftm ost or 
rightm ost position), w hat happens when going beyond th a t edge? Does it 
w raparound to the opposite edge or stay at th a t edge?
• D igit W rap aro u n d  W hen reaching the m inim um  or m axim um  num ber 
for a particu lar digit (0 or 9) w hat happens when a ttem p ting  to go beyond 
it? Does it w raparound to  the other edge or stay on the  same num ber?
• A rith m e tic  A nother option for going beyond the edge for a particu lar 
digit is doing simple arithm etic operations. If a t P I  and a | is pressed does 
it show 0 and add 1 to  the next digit? (Therefore having a display showing 
the ?)
• B lock e rro rs  -  If a user action does not change the  interface, block 
in teraction and alert the user.
A system  th a t alerts the  user to  slips might, be seen as less forgiving, bu t the 
payoff is (potentially) greater resilience. If the interface displays an alert, blocking 
further in teraction until it is cleared, the user will usually become aware of the 
problem , and can recover from it. For example, suppose a user’s task  of “get from 
m to  n ” is in terrup ted  because of a detected  error, w ith the display in s ta te  m'; it
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is then reasonable to suppose that the user effectively abandons their old task, and 
adopts a new one, namely “get from m! to n.”
4.2 Differential Formal Analysis im plementation
SKSS was implemented in C #  to analyse number entry designs with the design 
features described above.The probability of out by 10 error for each design was used 
to determine a rank.
The main points raised by this process were about how users key in numbers 
and how the features behave at the boundaries. To simulate number entry, we 
considered finding the best possible path from one number to another but we found 
that programming solvers for the best path was complex and it is unlikely that a 
user enters numbers in this way. We agreed to implement realistic, simple solvers 
that consider shortcuts users are likely to take; however these raised issues are worth 
studying empirically, especially since the domain is safety critical.
4.2 .1  Solvers
Four solvers were implemented and a detailed description is given here. The solvers 
take number pairs (a,b) as parameters and generate a key sequence that changes 
the display from number a to number b. These four solvers were tested using 106 
number pairs to ensure that they generated the correct key sequences with no errors. 
The four solvers are:
• Digit wraparound for a cursor left start interface
• Digit wraparound for a cursor right start interface
• No digit wraparound for a cursor left start interface
• No digit wraparound for a cursor right start interface
A solver for arithmetic has not been implemented and the solvers with no digit 
wraparound are used for the designs that implement arithmetic (choosing left and
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right s ta r t depending 011 the  design). This assum es th a t users do not use the arith ­
metic feature or are unaware of it. C hap ter 5 describes an em pirical analysis of 
strategies used by clinicians in a hospital and the  results indicate th a t th is was a 
plausible assum ption. The device th a t has an arithm etic design did not show any 
log of the arithm etic feature being used.
Broadly, there are two distinct solvers w ith a left and right solver for each. The 
difference between left and right s ta r t solvers is th a t left s ta r t is used on a left s ta rt 
interface and it keys in a sequence going from left to  right where as the right s ta rt 
solver works symmetrically.
The digit w raparound solvers are used for interfaces th a t have digit w raparound 
enabled. A piecewise sub traction  is perform ed 011 the num ber pair th a t is given 
as input to  the solver and on each digit, the following logic is used to  build the 
key sequence:
Let d be the piecewise difference result for the particu lar digit. Let m  be the 
ceiling of m axim um  possible digit divided by 2. T hat is, if the m axim um  possible 
digit is 9. m would be 5. Let the m axim um  possible digit be mD. The keySe- 
quenee.A ddRange function adds key presses to the tem porary  key sequence and the 
repeatC har function repeats a keyPress for the desired num ber of times.
L isting 4.1: D ig it wraparound solver logic
if ((d <= m) && diff[i] > 0) //e.g 2 -> 4 = UU 
{
keySequence.A d d R a n g e (repeatChar("U", d ) );
}
if (d > m) //e.g. 2 -> 9 = DDD 
{
keySequence.A d d R a n g e (repeatChar("D", mD[i] - d ) );
}
if (diff[i] <= -mD) //e.g. 9 -> 2 = UUU 
{
keySequence.A d d R a n g e (repeatChar("U", mD + d ) );
}
if ((d < 0) && d > -mD) // e.g. 7 -> 4 = DDD
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{keySequence.A d d R a n g e (repeatChar("D", -d ) );
}
Therefore here are some exam ples of how this logic works.
•  If a digit 2 should be changed to  4, UU is added to  the key sequence
• If 2 should be changed to 9ok :), DDD is added to  the key sequence
• If 9 should be changed to 2. UUU is added to  the key sequence
•  If 7 should be changed to  4, DDD is added to the key sequence
Solvers th a t do not have w raparound work in the following way. Let d be tie  
piecewise difference result for the particu lar digit.
L isting 4.2: N o wraparound solver logic
if (d < 0) {
keySequence.AddRange (repeatChar ("D", -d));
}
if (d > 0) {
keySequence.AddRange (repeatChar ("U", d ) );
}
Therefore, if the  digit to  be entered is greater than  the value on the current 
display, the  correct am ount of up bu ttons are pressed and if the digit is smaller th a i 
the currently  displayed digit, the correct num ber of down bu ttons  are keyed.
4.3 R esults
Figure 4.4 shows an exam ple of dependence of error sensitivity on w hether a fea tun  
is on or off. Block errors is the feature th a t most improves the  design, followed b7 
left s ta rt, cursor w raparound, arithm etic and vertical w raparound.
One em pirical question raised from the  Differential Formal Analysis process ii 
does the probability of keystroke error m atter?  Figure 4.5 shows the results of 1)
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B lo ck  E rrors
Cursor
Wraparound
Vertical
Wraparound
Arithmetic
Ignore Errors Right Start No Cursor No No Vertical
Wraparound Arithmetic Wraparound
Figure 4.4: Summary of C #  analysis findings. Features mentioned at the top of the  
bars are better, by the factor shown. Specifically, over ail design choices, blocking 
errors reduces the mean sensitivity o f the 5-key interface by a factor o f  1.41, start 
at left is better than start at right by a factor of 0 .98, cursor wraparound is better  
than no cursor wraparound by a factor of 0.91, arithmetic is better than no arithmetic 
by a factor o f 0.9 and vertical wraparound gives us an improvement over no vertical 
wraparound by a factor of 0.88.
SKSS trials w ith varying keystroke slip probability  varying between 0.0001 to  0.001 
w ith a step  of 0.0001. Each tria l was run  w ith 105 num ber pairs and the  keystroke 
errors were chosen random ly from transposition , deletion, repetition  and su b stitu ­
tion w ith  each error type having the  same probability  of occurring. Figure 4.5 shows 
typical results, p lo tting  sensitivity against keystroke slip probabilities. Because the 
sensitiv ity /key stroke error probability has an excellent linear correlation (R 2 =  0.995 
or b e tte r) the rank order and hence the recom m ended design decisions do not 
depend on the value of p : in other words, doing an experim ent to  determ ine p  does 
not seem necessary.
A nother im portan t question is about the particu lar mix of types of errors. The 
parallel coordinates plot in figure 4.6 shows the relation of how the  ranking scores 
for each different design change depending on w hat type of slips we have in SKSS. 
The vertical lines in the diagram  represent each slip error type present in the ex-
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Figure 4.5: Sensitivity against p  for various combinations of design feature (from 
M athem atica).  The lower gradient lines represent better (less error-sensitive) designs.
perim ent: all slips w ith equal probability  of being chosen; transposition  errors only; 
deletion errors only; repetition  errors only; substitu tion  errors only. Each design is 
represented by a polyline passing through each of the vertical lines and the position 
of each vertex on the a line corresponds to  the  score value of each design. This vi­
sualisation suggests th a t designers should prioritise im proving designs for repetition 
errors since the  worst designs for the repetition  errors experim ent have the highest 
gradient when com pared to  the o ther experim ents and the best designs in repetition  
errors have the best gradients when com pared to th e  o ther experim ents.
For m ost of our results we ranked our designs based on the ir resilience to out 
by 10 errors. We ran an experim ent to  find out w hat happens if we consider other 
m agnitudes of error and we can see the relation of rankings in figure 4.7. Here we 
have a parallel coordinates visualisation th a t shows how the  probability of error (on 
the vertical axes) changes when considering different out by k errors. Each polyline 
in the diagram  represents a com bination of design features. The lower the polyline 
across the vertical axes, the smaller the sensitivity of the design to  keystroke errors 
(and, thus, the b e tte r  the  design). The interesting find in this tria l is th a t the best 
four designs rem ain tow ard the bo ttom  of the  visualisation and we do not have 
interleaving between the best designs. There are some interesting interleavings in
------------- Left start, wrap, arithmetic, ignore overflow
.................  Right start, wrap, dial, ignore overflow
-------------  Right start, wrap, arithmetic, ignore overflow
-------------  Right start, no wrap, dial, ignore overflow
0 0006  -------------  Right start, no wrap, arithmetic, ignore overflow
------------- Left start, wrap, dial, ignore overflow
------------- Left start, no wrap, arithmetic, ignore overflow
------------- Left start, no wrap, dial, ignore overflow
-------------  Right start, wrap, arithmetic, block overflow
0.0004  -------------Right start, no wrap, arithmetic, block overfjpwC
.................  Right start, wrap, dial, block o v e r flo w ^
-------------  Right start, no wrap, dial, b lo c k p v 6 r to > ^ 7 ^
-------------Left start, wrap, dial, blo c y o v g r ij jy ^ 'T '''
-------------  Left start, wrap, aril)^ eti00fof^ overt\ow
n ooo ? ------- -— — — .— —-
-------------  Left start, no y v r |g ^ ith m e tic , block^pverfrow
------------- Left st a ’ dial,_bioek]oy£
0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 0.001 0
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0.9 H--------------------------------   1--------------------------------
ALL ( w i t h  e q u a l  TRANSPOSITION DELETION REPETITION SUBSTITUTION
p r o b a b i l i t y )  (o n ly )  (o n ly )  (o n ly )  (o n ly )
Types of  slips in the experim ents
Figure 4.6: Parallel Coordinates visualisation showing the relation o f  design rankings 
depending on slips
th e  worse designs, however we are not interested in th is since those designs w ith 
significantly higher sensitivity should not be im plem ented.
4.4 D iscussion
A pplying the  Differential Formal Analysis process on 5-key num ber entry  systems 
raises questions th a t would not have been raised otherwise. One can discuss the 
different features, the sim ulation m ethod itself and the errors and  com binations 
of errors.
One im portan t em pirical question th a t has not been addressed in this chapter 
and not addressed in this thesis is w hether users understand  the particu lar design 
features. A lthough the arithm etic  feature seems to  be a good idea from these results, 
if users do not understand  the feature, it might be less safe. It is im portan t for 
em pirical trials to be carried out to  address th is question.
A nother im portan t feature to  be studied is the  block errors feature. Blocking 
errors is clearly im portan t from the results presented in th is chapter, b u t how can
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Figure 4.7: Out by k  errors for different design types.
we block errors such th a t it works well in clinical settings? This is an im port ait 
question to  be explored and an im portan t feature to  be im plem ented in safety criti<al 
num ber entry.
After reading th is chapter, one may also s ta rt thinking about new features tin t 
can be studied. This is one of the benefits of applying the Differential Fornal 
Analysis process and it is indeed im portant for a safety critical system  to  be w41 
thought out. New features can certainly be created, it is im portan t to explore these 
new features both  to  make sure th a t they are understood by users and to  find tie  
best com bination through Differential Formal Analysis .
In this chapter, the  results for 5-key num ber entry are derived using randan  
num bers. W isem an, Cox, and Brumby (2013) argue th a t the num bers used in clinical 
scenarios are not random . F inding out w hat types of num bers are used on 5-k*y 
devices in hospitals and w hether they change the results derived from this chapter 
is a useful question to  answer. This work is presented in chapter 5.
How solvers are im plem ented is another point of concern. How do we know tin t 
the solvers im plem ented in th is chapter are indeed realistic? C hapter 5 describes 
how logs from 5-key devices used in a hospital were collected and num ber entey
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strategies were analysed. These findings were then used to inform the differential 
formal analysis process and the differences in results are discussed.
4.5 Use in procurement
Procurement is a dual of design: alternative designs are evaluated to choose which 
ones to purchase, whereas in design, evaluation informs which features to implement 
or improve. Procurement is concerned with evaluating finished products, so it would 
be natural to reverse engineer them and apply the proposed methodology to search 
for critical features that may distinguish the products on offer. However, because 
the companies selling the devices offered for procurement would then have a financial 
stake in the outcome, it is likely that an extra step would be feasible: the manu­
facturers could either provide models for evaluation (though this may accidentally 
leak proprietary information), or they could help procurement check the validity of 
their models (this better controls access to proprietary information). The approach 
proposed in this thesis could give procurers a way to evaluate which interface design 
works best towards reducing number entry error rates.
4.6 Empirical questions raised
Prom figure 4.4 we see that starting at the left is less sensitive to error than starting 
at the right. A possible explanation for this is that if, as a user performs a sequence 
of keystrokes that move from right (least significant) to left (most significant), then 
as errors accumulate the overall numerical effect gets larger and larger; from left to 
right, the opposite is true. On the other hand, perhaps in reality, starting on the 
far left raises the risk of confusion about which column the user is modifying — so 
in practice, it might turn out that right-to-left is the best strategy overall. Thus 
the empirical question: what do users do, and do they make slips we are not yet 
modelling when they start on the left or right?
We devised suitable and realistic strategies for our solvers, but there is no evi­
dence that they accurately reflect how users find paths between numbers in 5-key
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interfaces. In particular, when wraparound and arithmetic are available, do users 
take advantage of them to reduce path length? Can they reliably find the shortest 
path, or is this strategy too complex to employ in reality?
The feature that we call “block errors” is important to implement, as we s^ e 
from figure 4.4. A related empirical question, then, is how should “block errors” be 
implemented to best alert the user of a possible keying error? Do we stop interaction 
and ask the user to start over? Do we alert (through sounds, vibration, flashing etc) 
and let the user continue entering the number? There are probably other ways )f 
doing this: it is worth finding out and getting it right.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen how the Differential Formal Analysis process presented 
in chapter 3 can be applied to one type of safety critical system. We take the case of 
5-key number entry since previous studies by Oladimeji et al. (2013) indicate tint 
the 5-key number entry layout is least susceptible to errors from an empirical triil 
that compares five different button layouts for number entry.
The features for 5-key number entry systems were described and how the differ­
ential formal analysis process was implemented was detailed. Empirical questions 
can be raised about whether users would understand the features presented and 
whether users were simulated realistically in the process. Users’ understanding of 
the features has not been explored in this thesis, yet it is an important step fcr 
future work.
Results about how best to implement 5-key number entry systems are presented. 
The most important feature to implement is the block errors feature. Although ve 
know that it is important to block errors, we have not yet studied how it is beet 
to do this in clinical settings. Finding this out is out of scope for this thesis but 
certainly important.
Empirical questions regarding the probability of keystroke error and the mix of 
errors that occur were raised. Before running time consuming and costly user triafe 
to find out the answers for these questions, we ran the Differential Formal Analyss
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process to find out whether the answers to these questions matter. Our results show 
that these questions do not matter when running Differential Formal Analysis and 
thus saving time and money for running the experiments.
In the next chapter, medical device logs were analysed to answer some empirical 
questions raised by the Differential Formal Analysis process. We will see what 
types of numbers are entered into 5-key infusion pumps in a hospital setting, what 
strategies clinicians use to enter values and also have a look at what errors occur. 
The results from the infusion pump log analysis are used as parameters in the SKSS 
method and the results from running SKSS will be domain specific for medical 
infusion pumps.
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Chapter 5 
Using medical device logs for 
improving medical device design
A systematic analysis of combinations of features of a 5-key number system was 
presented in chapter 4. This chapter indicates the scale and types of quantitative 
errors to which the combinations are susceptible and is used as a starting point to 
investigate the actual error behaviour relating to one or another particular combina­
tion of design features. To do this, keystroke and event logs — taken from current 
infusion pumps in hospital use — are used to inform and extend the Differential 
Formal Analysis process, thus grounding it in empirical evidence. The logs com­
bined with the analysis raise suggestions about how manufacturers could improve 
log mechanisms to further help interaction design, and hence improve device safety. 
By this means a detailed understanding can be obtained of the predictive power of 
the formal analysis. The broader aim is to produce a rigorous evaluation approach 
that can be used effectively in design without the need for extensive user trials.
Medical device logs have been analysed by Lee et al. (2012). Lee et al. (2012) 
present valuable insight into how infusion pumps are used in hospitals, how we can 
gain insight into hospital infrastructure, how much it costs for nurses to attend to 
alarms over a period of a year and other interesting findings that can significantly 
improve healthcare systems. In this thesis, there is a different focus on retrieving 
information from logs. The concern here is rather to answer very specific empirical 
questions to tailor the Differential Formal Analysis method to the medical domain
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rather than to compare or discuss issues found in (Lee et ah, 2012).
Section 5.1 describes the methods used to analyse the log data retrieved from 
medical devices used in a hospital. The section describes in detail how noticed 
errors were detected, the distribution of numbers used and the strategies employed 
by the users for entering numbers. Section 5.2 presents the findings from the use 
logs after implementing the 5 key methods described, and presents results related 
to noticed errors.
Section 5.4 discusses how the empirical data were used to focus the 5-key analysis 
and its relevance to the medical domain. Section 5.5 discusses the results obtained 
by performing an empirically grounded analytical evaluation and compares it to 
previous findings.
Section 5.6 discusses the implications of this chapter; and finally, Section 5.7 
draws conclusions about what was learnt from this chapter.
5.1 Medical device log analysis method
The medical device logs of 19 BBraun Infusomat Space infusion pumps from the 
device library of the Royal Free Hospital in London were retrieved. They are in 
everyday use in the Royal Free Hospital in a range of contexts and reflect typical 
use. The BBraun Infusomat Space is a volumetric infusion pump model that has 5 
buttons to enter numbers: fA~) [~r~] P«~) p^~| and |OK|. The number entry system is 
implemented so that the cursor starts at the right, the digits have simple arithmetic 
and there is no cursor or digit wraparound. The block errors feature is not present 
in this infusion pump.
BBraun Infusomat Space pump logs are split into two files. The first file (the 
device logs file) logs input at an event level while the second (the keystroke logs file) 
logs input at a keystroke level. The device logs file contains event log records with 
the following field structure:
• Num ber -  An identifier for the event log.
•  D ate -  The date when the event happened in DD/MM/YYYY format.
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• T im e -  The time when the event happened in HH:MM:SS format.
• Event -  A description of the event (e.g., “New VTBI set”).
• Value -  The value of the event in the form of either a number (e.g., 100) or a 
textual description (e.g., “ON”). Whether the value is a number or a textual 
description depends on the Event field.
• U nit -  The unit of the value. When the Value field is a number, the Unit 
field would specify the unit of that value (e.g., mL), otherwise the Unit field 
is left blank.
The log records were in the following structure:
• Num ber -  An identifier for the key log.
• D ate -  The date when the key was pressed in DD/MM/YYYY format.
• T im e -  The time when the key was pressed in HH:MM:SS format.
• K ey -  The key pressed (e.g., Arrow_Up).
• M enu -  The menu in which the device was in when the key was pressed (e.g., 
“MAIN”).
The first log relating to the 19 devices is from 22/03/2009 and the last log is from 
13/12/2012. The devices have been in use in the hospital for 1,362 days, just over 
3 years and 8 months worth of data. The sum of the total time of use of all of the 
devices is 4,368 days, almost 12 years in all, though the restriction to only the last 
200 keystrokes limits the actual duration of user interaction available for analysis.
5.1 .1  N o ticed  errors
The log data provides a source for occurrences of number entry error. The log data 
does not provide information about whether the input value is correct or not. For 
this to be possible it would be necessary to compare the log data with the doc­
to r’s prescription for the infusion. This was not possible both because prescriptions
contain sensitive patien t d a ta  and anonym ized prescriptions are not available, aid  
because of the difficulty of correlating prescriptions w ith this large source of date.
However the logs can be used to  detect noticed errors. These errors can ]>e 
observed in a log when a num ber is entered and apparently  corrected by entering 
another num ber a short while after. These corrections are m ade rapidly, suggestiig 
th a t the user is correcting a slip ra ther than  correcting a mistake. S trictly speakirg, 
it is also possible th a t the corrected num ber is erroneous — th a t is, the user made 
a mistake in perform ing the  correction. These noticed errors understa te  the sum  )f 
num ber en try  errors, however they provide d a ta  about a subset.
The tim e frame rela ted  to  noticed errors is set to be 2 m inutes in the analyses 
described here. T hat is, input values are considered erroneous if they are set le;s 
than  2 m inutes apart until the value stops being changed w ithin 2 m inutes aft«r 
the previous value was set. This tim e frame was chosen because it is a reasonabe 
tim e frame to  notice and correct an error. A tim e frame of 1 m inute was previousy 
considered, but in the case of Listing 5.2, the correct value seemed to be 0.80 mL 
which we suspected was not correct. The tim e frame was increased to  2 minutes 
and got w hat we see in Listing 5.2. 1000.00 mL is a more reasonable num ber for m 
infusion. We considered 3 m inutes to  see w hether the num ber of errors changed b it 
they did not so for th is case, 2 m inutes is reasonable.
Noticed errors give some insight into error m agnitudes and what caused tie  
errors and it is also interesting to  find out how frequently near misses occur. Noticed 
errors are defined to  occur in the  logs when values are set a small tim e frame a p a r . 
Listing 5.1 is an exam ple of two log entries. The first input value is considered la 
be a noticed error, and the second value to  be the num ber th a t was intended.
1891, 25/10/2012,
1892, 25/10/2012,
12 : 02:48, 
12:03:04,
New VTBI set, 10, ml 
New VTBI set, 100, ml
In the case of Listing 5.1, it can be seen th a t a new V TBI is set 16 seconds aftir 
the  first V TBI. The error th a t is noticed has a m agnitude of 10 (also known as ai 
out by 10 error). At the keystroke level, it m ay be assum ed th a t the clinician missel
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pressing the  “left” key.
There are instances in the logs where several V TBIs are set in quick succession, 
for exam ple in Listing 5.2.
1538, 29/10/2012, 19:32:10, New VTBI set, 1. 00, ml
1539, 29/10/2012, 19:32:44, New VTBI set, 1.07, ml
1540, 29/10/2012, 19:33:06, New VTBI set, 1.87, ml
1541, 29/10/2012, 19:33:33, New VTBI set, 1. 86, ml
1542, 29/10/2012, 19:33:59, New VTBI set, 0.80, ml
1543, 29/10/2012, 19:34:59, New VTBI set, 1. 00, ml
1544, 29/10/2012, 19:35:57, New VTBI set, 10000 .00, ml
1545, 29/10/2012, 19:36:26, New VTBI set, 1000 .00, ml
Listing 5.2 appears to indicate th a t the first 7 input V TBIs were erroneous 
and th a t the  correct V TBI is the last one entered (1000.00 mL). To determ ine 
error m agnitudes, the first 7 inpu t num bers are com pared to  the  final, which is 
considered to  be the intended num ber. This gives insight into how large the  error 
would have been had it been unnoticed, and w hat keystrokes were erroneous in the 
first keystroke sequence.
5 . 1 . 2  N u m b e r s  u s e d  i n  i n f u s i o n s
The m ethod described in chapter 3 generates random  num bers as a means of explor­
ing the  probable errors generated by the different designs. As already m entioned 
and argued in (W isem an, Cox, V Brumby, 2012) the num ber entry d istribu tion  in 
infusion pum ps does not follow the rectangular d istribu tion  of the random  num bers 
generated  in chapter 3. Noticed errors are used to  assess the  error d istribu tion  in 
the  logs. Num bers th a t are near misses are not considered, and num bers th a t end 
in “.00" are trun ca ted  to  integers.
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5.1 .3  N u m b er en try  stra teg ies
The keystroke logs also provide insight into the strategies that practitioners use :o 
enter numbers into the infusion pumps. The BBraun Infusomat Space logs are spit 
into two files. The rates and VTBIs recorded in the device log file were used to fiid 
the corresponding sequence of keystrokes that were needed to input that numter 
in the keystroke log file by comparing the date and time of the logs. To ass6s 
number entry strategies the VTBIs and Rates entered were considered irrespective 
of whether a noticed error occurred. It was not possible to identify individuals 
and therefore individual strategies. The results therefore ignore the possibility ff 
individual differences. All the logged strategies employed by clinicians were identifitd 
before counting how many times the particular strategy was used. From this tie 
probability that a particular strategy be used was derived.
5.2 Medical device log analysis results
The methods described in Section 5.1 were used to derive the noticed error, digt 
and number distributions and number entry strategies. This section discusses tie 
results obtained from the analysis before describing the implications of the result!.
5.2 .1  Error A n a lysis
The total number of VTBIs set in all 19 devices together was 1,409 and the totil 
noticed errors detected by our method was 103 which gives us an error percentage »f 
7.13% of inputs. The total number of Rates set in all 19 devices together was 1,171 
and the total noticed errors detected was 198 giving a percentage error of 16.91% 
The error rates are different between VTBIs and Rates because they are both s(t 
individually on the device.
The devices did not have the same percentage of error rates and figure 5.1 shovs 
the percentage error rates for Rates and VTBIs for each individual device. ErroB 
in entering Rates are higher for 17 of the 19 devices.
Although there are higher errors for rates, rates have more small errors and ii
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Figure 5.1: Frequency o f  noticed errors, as percentages for VTBI and Rate input. 
The graph shows the mean (black bars), median (white bars), 25% quartiles (top and 
b ottom  edges  o f box), and range (top and bottom  bars) of the N  =  19 device logs.
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Error  m a g n i t u d e
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■ R ate  E rror M a g n itu d e s  
All Error M a g n itu d e s
Figure 5.2: The x-axis of this bar graph shows the error magnitude and the y-axis 
shows the percentage frequency o f each error magnitude. The frequency o f the error 
magnitude was divided by the sum of errors and multiplied by 100. The graph shows  
the percentage frequencies for VTBI errors, Rate errors and combined VTBI and Rate.
VTBIs, whereas V TBIs have a larger num ber of higher m agnitude errors, specifically 
errors out by 10 (or more).
5 . 2 . 2  D i g i t  a n d  n u m b e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n s
The frequencies of individual digits were determ ined by considering only those num ­
bers entered th a t were not noticed errors. Figure 5.3 shows a bar graph of the  fre­
quency of occurrence of digits 0-9  and decimal point for V TBIs only, Rates only, as 
well as bo th  VTBIs and R ates together. The digit 0 is the m ost frequently inpu t 
digit and 4, 7, 8 and 9 are relatively rarely entered.
5 5
•  V T B Is
•  R ates 
Total
Figure 5.3: A bar graph showing the frequencies o f  occurrence o f digits in VTBIs, 
Rates and All VTBIs and Rates combined. The noticed errors were removed from this 
analysis.
5 . 2 . 3  N u m b e r  e n t r y  s t r a t e g i e s
Since the  B Braun Infusom at Space logs only store the last 200 keystrokes, it was 
only possible to retrieve 68 num ber entry keystroke strategies from the num bers 
entered. Of interest is how clinicians go about entering the num ber. The features of 
the B B raun Infusom at Space 5-key num ber entry interface (see Section 4) relevant 
here are:
• No digit w raparound
• No cursor w raparound
• A rithm etic
• The cursor s ta rts  on the  right
•  No error blocking
Strategies relating to  68 num bers were considered.
A rith m e tic
A lthough the B Braun Infusom at Space has an arithm etic feature, no strategy  ap­
pears to  take advantage of this feature. For example, to  enter the value 9, from a 
screen showing ^  is possible either to  press nine tim es or to key in lZ J T J  
i ► 1 ▼ [. In other words 10 is first input then units w ith ▼ | is used to  sub trac t 1
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8000
6000
4000
3000
2000
I | 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Individual digits and the decimal point
from the value displayed. Although using the arithmetic feature reduces the number 
of keystrokes in a lot of the numbers input, clinicians have not taken advantage of it.
Left and right start
The BBraun Infusomat Space number entry system has a right start cursor position. 
Instances were observed of practitioners entering numbers such as 955 (from the 
starting screen of B M ) by first pressing | < \ three times then entering the number 
from left to right. This means that a left to right input strategy is used on an 
interface which starts on the right.
Prom 60 of the numbers that were entered only 1 digit needed changing. For 
example when the number 100 is entered on a starting screen of P I , the key 
sequence used is ] < \ [ < \ [ a |. It is impossible to tell in these cases whether the 
practitioner intended to use a left-to-right input strategy or a right-to-left input 
strategy because to be able to tell this, at least two digits need to be changed.
Prom the rest of the eight keystroke logs of entered numbers, 5 numbers were 
entered using a left-to-right strategy and 3 numbers were entered using a right-to- 
left strategy.
O vershooting and correction
Several instances of overshooting and correction behaviour were visible in the logs. 
For example if the clinician aims to enter the digit 3, then [ a 11 a 11 a 11 a 11 a 11 ▼ | 
1 ▼ | are pressed. In this case, there is an overshoot and correction of magnitude 2. 
The user notices that there is an overshoot by two [ A | presses and corrects the over­
shoot by pressing the button which performs the opposite action, in this case [ ▼ |.
This behaviour can be discerned in his style of interface because each number 
entry button has clear opposite buttons, for example \~*~] and PT1 and [~<~\ and [ ► | 
are opposites. Such overshoot and correction behaviour will not occur in a number 
entry interface that use a numeric keypad.
The logs indicate nine instances of overshoot and correction, making the prob­
ability of overshoot and correction 0.01. In 8 of the instances, the magnitude of 
overshoot and correction was 1 and in the other instance it was 2.
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5.3 Implications from log analysis
This study was focused towards answering empirical questions raised by the analysis 
presented in chapter 3. This theoretical analysis is, so far, general and not specific 
to any domain. Using the empirical results derived from the logs it was possible 
to tailor the Differential Formal Analysis method to give results specifically for this 
medical domain.
Particular number entry strategies were used by clinicians that could be im­
plemented in the automated analysis. A question to be considered is whether the 
addition of these new strategies has any effect on the design rankings described in 
chapter 3. Specifically, it suggests that left-to-right entry behaviour will occur on 
designs that start out on the right and right-to-left behaviour on designs which start 
on the left.
The observed left-to-right strategy from the logs might be because these logs were 
collected from a hospital in London and most of the clinicians using the devices used 
English or a European language as first language that writes from left-to-right. It 
is possible that logs involving clinicians using other languages which write from 
right-to-left, would have resulted in a higher proportion of right-to-left strategies. 
Therefore, in analysing the designs, both left-to-right and right-to-left strategies 
should be implemented on designs that start from left and right. This is an inter­
esting issue for manufacturers to consider for the localisation of their devices since 
the extra keystrokes required to start number entry from the desired digit may lead 
to errors.
Another behavior to include in strategies is overshooting and correction be­
haviour. Although the overshooting and corrections that are detected in this analysis 
lead to the intended input values by the user, it is possible to have keystroke errors 
within that overshoot and recovery sequence. This should be modelled and this may 
change analysis results about the best 5-key number entry designs. The magnitude 
of the overshoot and correction should be based on the findings in this study.
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5.4 Stochastic key slip simulation m ethod
The Differential Formal Analysis method ranks number entry designs based on out 
by 10 error rates. The core of the method is the Stochastic Key Slip Simulation 
procedure (SKSS) which needs tailoring to the findings from the logs.
The SKSS method works by randomly generating N  pairs (a , 6), where N  is the 
number of tasks. A solver uses a strategy to generate a key sequence to go from a 
to b. Then for each key in that key sequence, with a probability p per keystroke a 
key slip is injected that is either repetition, where a key is repeated, substitution, 
where another key is entered erroneously, transposition, where the sequence of two 
keys is transposed, or deletion where pressing a key is omitted. After inserting the 
key slips using probability p, the resulting key sequence is used to simulate keying 
in that sequence on a design which starts from a display showing the number a. The 
resultant value is then compared to the original intended value b to find out whether 
the error is out by 10 or not.
To base the simulations on the empirical findings, instead of generating random 
number pairs, numbers are generated that follow the same digit distributions found 
in the log analysis. The new strategies generate key sequences from a to b with left- 
to-right start on right start interfaces and right-to left start on left start interfaces. 
The probability of starting from the left was set to 0.625.
Overshooting and correction behaviour is also implemented. Before injecting 
key slips to a key sequence, overshoots are inserted along with corrections with 
a probability o per keystroke. The overshoot and correction in this case had a 
magnitude m = 1 89% of the time and m  = 2 11% of the time.
5.5 Stochastic key slip simulation results
The previous implementations of Differential Formal Analysis were extended to re­
flect findings from the medical device logs. New solvers were implemented to reflect 
the new left-to-right strategies for right start designs and right-to-left strategies for 
left start designs. These solvers were tested with 10,000 number pairs to make sure 
that they work correctly and do not cause errors themselves.
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Overshoot and correction behavior as observed in the keystroke logs was also 
implemented. This was implemented by performing an overshoot and correction 
behavior with probability pQ per keystroke. For each keystroke upon which overshoot 
and recovery was performed, this was achieved with a magnitude m  by inserting 
that keystroke m  times, then correcting by inserting m  keystrokes which perform 
the opposite action. For example, consider a key sequence [ < \ | a |. Overshooting 
and correction on the second keystroke with m  = 2, the key sequence would be | < |
aaaas
After implementing the solvers with this overshoot and correction behaviour, 
they were tested with 10,000 tasks, a number of observations could be made. Designs 
that do not block errors and do not allow wraparound are the designs that cause 
errors on this type of overshoot and correction. All designs that block errors result 
in 0 errors from these trials, as well as designs that enable digit and/or arithmetic 
wraparound and cursor wraparound.
Consider a design with no cursor wraparound and no block errors with a display 
showing A plausible key sequence for the value of 0.05 is [ ► | [ ► | [ a |5. If
overshooting on the second [ ► | and correcting by m  = 2 the key sequence would 
become [ ► I4 | < p [ a |5. Since the display does not wraparound and does not block, 
the two I * ) key presses in the overshooting do not change the display, but the 
correction sequence of two [ < \ key presses move the cursor to the left. This means 
that the rest of the key sequence would be changing the wrong digit and in this case, 
the result from the key sequence with the inserted overshoot and correction would 
be a display showing that is a value 100 times bigger than intended. If the
same design had the block errors feature enabled, this large error would not have 
occurred because the interface would block on the first extra [ ► | key press.
5.5.1 P ro b a b ility  o f  keystroke error
While the probability of overshooting and correction and the magnitude probabilities 
of the overshoot can be discerned from the device logs one variable that is still 
unknown is the probability per keystroke error. In order to decide whether this 
matters consider a graph of probability per keystroke error against percentage of
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Figure 5.4: This graph plots probability per keystroke error against percentage of out 
by 10 errors. T he lower the gradient o f  the line, the better the design. One can see  
from the graph that the best design is clearly best no matter what the probability per 
keystroke error is.
out by 10 errors. The results from figure 5.4 which were generated using 1.000.000 
medical numbers, the probability of overshooting and correcting was set to 0.01 and 
for each overshoot and correction, the probability that m  =  1 was set to 0.89 and 
that in = 2 was set at 0.11. The probability of choosing a strategy that starts from 
left-to-right for setting the number was set to 0.625 and from right-to-left at 0.375.
In figure 5.4, the design with the lower gradient is the best design since it is 
the one that caused least out by 10 errors. The best design is clearly best for 
any probability per keystroke error. This means that it is not necessary to decide 
empirically what p is.
5 . 5 . 2  F e a t u r e  a n a l y s i s
From figure 5.4, the feature combination of the design that came out the best has digit 
wraparound, no arithmetic, no cursor wraparound, starts on the right and blocks errors.
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Figure 5.5: This bar chart shows whether features are better on or off. W e used the  
gradients o f the trend lines o f each design from the probability per keystroke error 
analysis to  score each feature. The features are scored by summing th ese  gradients in 
designs which had the feature on and off respectively. A lower score means that the  
feature is better.
Figure 5.5 indicates how each feature by itself contributes to out by 10 errors. 
The feature name is given on the x-axis and the v-axis provides two scores for each 
feature, one for when it is enabled and on for when it is not. The score of the feature 
was obtained by summing the gradient of the trend lines of the graphs in figure 5.4 
where a design had the feature on and off respectively. The lower the score, the 
better the feature. Designs with both digit and cursor wraparound do better than 
other designs. This is consistent with the earlier prediction about errors generated 
from the overshoot and correction behaviour. Blocking errors is an important feature 
to have and no arithmetic is better than arithmetic and right start is better than 
left start.
5 . 5 . 3  E r r o r  m a g n i t u d e  f r e q u e n c i e s
To compare the theoretical model with the logs, SKSS trials were run for the design 
with the same features as the BBraun Infusomat Space pump. Between the theo-
1 1
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retical model and the log analysis, one point of comparison is the frequency of error 
magnitudes. 1.000.000 number entry tasks were executed with medical numbers 
with the SKSS settings described previously. Rather than only looking at out by 
10 errors, all the error magnitudes were considered to compare them to the error 
magnitudes graph for the noticed errors in the device logs in figure 5.2.
The error magnitude frequencies from the simulations were compared to those 
from the log analysis magnitude frequencies. The shape of the bar graph was not 
quite the same. A point that may have caused the discrepancy between what the 
model generated and what was found in the logs is that the probabilities of each 
error type occurring are unknown. From the logs it was not possible to find this out. 
Figure 5.6 shows bar charts for error magnitude against the percentage frequency 
of that error magnitude for all error types equally likely to occur, and each error 
type individually. Although predictions show that smaller errors are much higher 
in proportion to those observed in the logs, the bar graphs for repetition errors are 
very similar in shape to the one seen in the log analysis with higher out by 10 and 
out by 5 error rates.
This might indicate that repetition errors are far more frequent on 5-key number 
entry systems than any other type of error. Substitution errors for example, do seem 
less likely on 5-key systems because of the small number of buttons. However, it 
might mean that repetition errors are the ones that are noticed, and can be detected. 
It is possible that it is less likely for practitioners to notice substitution, transposition 
and deletion errors than they are to notice repetition errors.
*  All e r r o r s
*  R epetition
*  Substitu tion  
a  T ransposition 
a  D eletion
_ — I  T
6>x<=7 7>x<=8 8>x<=9 9>x<=10 x>=10
% Frequency o f  error m agnitude
Figure 5.6: A bar graph showing th e  frequencies o f  error magnitudes when running 
simulations on with all possible error types, and each error type individually.
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5.6 Discussion
This chapter focuses specifically on retrieving information from real clinical logs to 
help inform theoretical methods. Here the implications of our findings and their 
relation to the analysis method are discussed. Other possibilities for using the rich 
source of data that can be collected in logs.
5.6 .1  Im p lication s for th eo retica l m eth od s
Our analysis shows that some empirical questions that were raised in chapter 3 can 
be answered in the context of a particular domain by analysing medical device logs. 
Retrieving use logs provides a large volume of situated use data that can be collected 
in a way that is not intrusive. In particular, the data indicate that the numbers used 
in infusion pumps are not the random numbers used for the study in chapter 3. To 
apply the Differential Formal Analysis technique to the medical domain, it would 
be interesting to run the study using the numbers obtained from the devices rather 
than random numbers with arbitrary distributions.
The number entry strategies used in this chapter can also be used to inform 
analytical methods. Implementing the strategies found in the logs in Differential 
Formal Analysis has made the analysis closer to reality and it would be interesting 
to compare results from previous trials to the empirically informed results.
In the case of strategies, the overshooting and correction behaviour is not ap­
parent in the presented Differential Formal Analysis and since errors can occur 
within that behaviour it is worth implementing and checking whether the design 
rankings change.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter a case was made for empirically informing the Differential Formal 
Analysis process to compare results for 5-key number entry systems to the results 
previously presented in chapter 4.
One of the challenges of the work presented in this chapter was that the available
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keystroke logs were only of the last 200 keystrokes. Although number entry strate­
gies were derivable from the limited data, for different and equally useful usability 
studies, 200 keystrokes is very little. Indeed depending on the frequency of usage of 
the pump, the 200 keystrokes logs covered a duration ranging from 95 days to just 
over four hours. For the logs we analysed in this study, after removing the outlier 
log that spanned 95 days, the keystroke logs covered a mean duration of 100 hours, 
with a standard deviation of 22 hours.
We suggest that all device keystroke logs are kept until the devices are taken for 
maintenance, typically approximately every six months. Based on an approximation 
derived from the logs analysed, this feature implies that the device keeps a record 
of the last 8,600 keystrokes. This would provide a rich set of data that could be 
processed and analysed periodically. Timing on all medical devices should be also 
be synchronised to allow accurate cross device log analyses. In addition, keystroke 
logs should contain detailed information that would make it possible to distinguish 
between different modes of interaction with device user interface widgets. For in­
stance it should be clear if the user performed a click action (i.e., a press quickly 
followed by a release) or a press and hold action. All these would allow for a more 
accurate and deterministic playback of user interactions on devices.
Although the focus here is on finding out very specific empirical questions, the 
log data can be used to obtain other interesting insights into how these devices are 
used in hospitals.
Important further work that manufacturers of medical devices should carry out 
is on improving the use logs on these devices and use them to perform empirical and 
analytical analyses to improve the safety of their device designs.
In this thesis, so far the Differential Formal Analysis process has been introduced 
and demonstrated through a case study on 5-key number entry. The results for 5- 
key number entry were tailored for the medical domain by empirically informing 
the Differential Formal Analysis process with medical data. We have seen that 
a seemingly simple user interface can be implemented in numerous different ways 
and by going through the Differential Formal Analysis process, healthy discussions 
about features, strategies, and other important issues are raised. This is useful and
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beneficial in safety critical domains, and Differential Formal Analysis encourages it.
In the next chapter, a critical analysis of Differential Formal Analysis is made. 
Chapter 7.1 discusses future work that is useful to carry out and chapter 7 makes 
concluding remarks.
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Chapter 6
Triangulating Stochastic K ey Slip 
Sim ulation and Empirical 
Techniques
Dependable interactive applications require different methodologies than conven­
tional usability approaches. For example, a standard laboratory experiment may 
find that users prefer one system to another, or that they make fewer errors or are 
faster. This is certainly useful information, but (except for very simple systems) a 
lab study cannot cover all features (let alone all states and transitions) of a system. 
If the interaction design has bugs — actual software bugs or poor boundary cases in 
the user interface — then human participant-based evaluation may not help enough. 
For complex systems, and for critical applications, reliance on user testing alone may 
not be good enough to assure a system has as few design defects as possible.
Good practice in user interface design is iterative design, where a system is 
designed, evaluated and then redesigned or otherwise improved, and the process is 
repeated. (Iterative design is enshrined in ISO standard 9241.) Thus iterative design 
acknowledges that we do not know how best to design (if we did, we would not need 
to evaluate designs and iterate them). Iteration also allows users to change their 
minds or express new insights into their requirements as they experience working 
prototypes. Equally, then, we ought to acknowledge we do not really know how to 
best evaluate a design either; why don’t we also do “iterative evaluation,” using and
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improving different techniques for evaluation — a sort-of meta iterative design? One 
way to do this would be to use radically different techniques, and then explore their 
different results in detail. Discrepancies require exploration, and either indicate 
inappropriate or inapplicable aspects of the evaluation methodologies or interesting 
aspects of the user interface design for further exploration. The point is in a safety 
critical application, one really wants to discover blindspots in the design process. 
Radically different evaluation methods are likely to complement each other in their 
ability to contribute to improving dependability.
In dependable design we want to find designs that reduce the probability of 
design defects affecting users or the success of the tasks they perform. In particular 
in safety critical design, we want to reduce error and the consequences of error, and to 
ensure the probabilities of design defects inducing problems to be as low as possible. 
Unlike conventional HCI, we are not primarily interested in understanding the user 
and their likes and dislikes, we want to find risky behaviours that may happen and 
make them less likely to happen (or happen and have unwanted consequences).
We therefore want to select or invent engineering features that reduce bad out­
comes when a user interface is used. Unfortunately as we improve the safety of a 
design, the probability that users do unsafe actions reduces, and the time it takes 
to do statistically valid experiments with users therefore increases. We cannot rely 
on a user evaluation that finds zero defects, as we do not know whether this means 
there are no defects or that the users in the experiment failed to find any. Logically, 
testing never shows the absence of problems.
One solution is to stress users so that their error rate is increased. This is 
problematic for two reasons: is there increased error rate representative of what 
users would really do without the artificial stress, and once we have stressed them 
to some rate and eliminated user interface problems, what do we do as we try to 
further improve the design? We can never stress users more and more indefinitely. 
Rather than rely entirely on increasingly expensive experiments with human users, 
however we do it, there is a point at which it becomes worthwhile and insightful to 
emphasise alternative evaluation methods that do not rely on human users. In this 
chapter, statistical analytic techniques are used. The human experiments give us an
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idea how users behave, and then we simulate human behaviour — along with human 
errors — using fast computer programs. It is then trivial to perform experiments 
that in a few minutes simulate impractically long conventional experiments. There 
is an interesting balance between the psychological validity and the scale and ease 
with which such experiments can be done.
Another way of looking at this triangulation process is to imagine a conventional 
usability experiment, say, with N  users, maybe 10, as participants. Typically, one 
user turns out to be an outlier, and they are examined closely and then discarded 
as unrepresentative. In the approach presented in this thesis, one of the users is 
a “robot” and of course is unrepresentative, but we know exactly why they are 
unrepresentative, so we can think through in detail whether for each feature we are 
interested in whether the robot performance is a good or poor indicator of required 
design improvements. As explained below, there is a very interesting feature of 
robots: the probability that they perform certain actions can be precisely controlled. 
We may then find that the best design changes are the same regardless (within broad 
limits) of those probabilities. In other words, sometimes we have parameterised the 
robot to be realistic (we got an initial value of some probability from real human 
performance) but it turns out the exact values do not matter.
This chapter argues that there is a significant variation in the safety of common 
number entry user interface design choices, at least under the assumptions used, 
which are based on real clinical data from infusion pumps.
The results show that safety should be assessed by a combination of empirical 
and analytic methods, and it thus follows that better user interfaces can be chosen 
on the basis of the assessments. This result is of use to manufacturers (who wish to 
design safer systems), to procurers (who wish to buy safer systems), and to patients 
(who wish to have safer treatment). In the long run, one could imagine that rigorous 
assessments of safety would be displayed prominently on devices (Thimbleby, 2013a), 
thus increasing awareness and hence would encourage more appropriate choices of 
designs for the uses to which they may be put.
Of course, safety is a complex design trade-off, and higher or lower safety as it is 
measured in this current work, has to be balanced against other criteria, including
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details of the user’s task (e.g., entering a new drug dose rate is a different task than 
adjusting an existing drug rate). Making at least some safety assessments available, 
even if not the whole story, is an important step forward.
The present work uses the combination of an analytic technique based on Stochas­
tic Key Slip Simulation (SKSS) that is described in chapter 3, with a lab study 
presented in (Oladimeji et al., 2013). This analytic technique allows us to analyse 
number entry interfaces to a detailed level of abstraction and the setup of a lab 
study allows us to log all the keystrokes we need and know when a number is en­
tered erroneously.
The implementation of the SKSS method has been extended to work on different 
types of number entry interfaces. This extension gives insight into the types of 
systems that can be modelled using this analytic method.
6.1 Previous work
KLM and GOMS, (Card, Newell, &; Moran, 2000) are well-established analytic meth­
ods that are useful for obtaining a measure of time to perform a specified goal. These 
techniques generally assume no use errors and evaluate unit tasks (CogTool is a tool 
that partly automates this process). In reality, a user may make errors while en­
tering a number and this requires careful analysis. The focus of our in the present 
work is error rate rather than time: for many applications, making a UI safer, and 
finding out how to make them safer, is more important than making them faster.
In safety critical systems, the safest design is not necessarily the fastest or most 
appealing to users. In safety critical domains, having a design that reduces errors is 
desirable. However, there are design trade-offs and an appropriate balance between 
speed and safety is required. Often making a device safer will make it slower (car 
brakes are a good example).
So far, in this thesis, an analytical method to study five-key number entry sys­
tems has been developed. This gave insights into how a single UI can be imple­
mented in several different ways, some of which are more likely to cause serious 
harm than others.
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Figure 6.1: The different keyboard configurations of Uls used in this study. All keypad 
layouts were constructed using the sam e physical former. This figure does not show 
the the device itself nor its conventional numeric display.
So far, the analytic analyses on number entry interfaces has been carried out on 
five-key interfaces in this thesis and on the number pad in by Thimbleby and Cairns 
(2010). In this chapter, the analytic method is extended to evaluate and compare 
the number entry systems studied by Oladimeji et al. (2013).
The results from the log analysis from chapter 5 are used in the analytical method 
to make the results specific to the domain of medical devices.
In safety critical medical device design, it is critical to triangulate number entry 
error from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. In doing this, insight into 
better use of the different methods and their role in the manufacturing process is pre­
sented in order to reduce unnecessary harm and death from bad interaction design.
6.2 Types of number entry U ls
The study presented in this chapter focuses on three different number entry styles 
shown in figure 6.1, that are discussed in the following subsections.
Since this study is based on empirical work on actual infusion pump use in a 
hospital, it remains beyond the scope of the present work to analyse other styles 
of Uls, such as those that rely on selecting from a menu of numeric values from 
lists, though it should be noted that some medical devices give the user a menu of 
standard values in this way.
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Figure 6.2: The physical prototype used in the lab study.
6 . 2 . 1  N u m b e r  p a d
The num ber pad UI allows num ber entry  using a 12-key numeric keypad in telephone- 
style layout (see figure la ). It has a decimal point and a cancel key. The decimal 
point key appends at most one decimal point to the  num ber on the display. The 
cancel key deletes the rightm ost character on the display. Inevitably, if the user 
keys m ore th a n  one decimal point, the cancel key’s behaviour is defective, as it will 
delete m ore keystrokes than  the user expects — this behaviour is typical of m any 
num ber en try  Uls w ith a cancel key.
The up-down UI has eight bu ttons arranged in two rows and four columns. The top 
row b u tto n s  increase individual digits in the  num ber, and the bo ttom  row bu ttons
6 . 2 . 2  U p - d o w n
reduce the the corresponding digits. In this UI, the rightmost column matches the 
hundredth place value and it is used to increase or decrease the value by 0.01. This 
UI uses the arithmetic configuration, described in chapter 4, which means the effect 
of decreasing a digit from 0 or increasing a digit from 9 is carried over to adjacent 
digits: for example, if the display is 20.56, decreasing the 0 would change the display 
to 19.56, thus changing two digits in this case.
6 .2 .3  F ive  key
The five key UI has four buttons arranged in a navigation style (up, down, left, 
right) and a button to enter the number. The left and right buttons move a cursor 
on the screen that selects a place value in the number, and the up and down buttons 
increase or decrease the selected digit. Like the up-down interface, this UI works in 
the arithmetic configuration.
6 .2 .4  C hevron  keys, knobs and o th er  sty les  o f  U I
Chevron-key interfaces (typically with upward facing chevron buttons and downward 
facing chevron buttons in a row) are also commonly used in medical devices. In 
contrast to the three styles we have evaluated, chevrons use a continuous interaction 
style: values change while the button is held down, and often a button can be held 
down longer to change the value faster. This type of UI is better suited to dynamic 
closed-loop feedback analysis (Niezen, 2013) and is not evaluated in the present work.
6.3 Experiments
In this chapter, the SKSS implementation from chapter 3 is extended to analyse 
more user interfaces that have been previously analysed empirically by Oladimeji 
et al. (2013). This section briefly describes the lab study from the previous work 
so that the differences between running empirical and analytic experiments can be 
highlighted. A description of how the previous SKSS implementation was extended 
to evaluate three of the user interfaces evaluated in the lab study is presented in
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Error Out by 2 Out by 10 Out by 100
All errors 83.7 16.3 0
D eletion 0 0 0
R epetition 100 0 0
Substitution 82 18 0
Transposition 0 0 0
Table 6.1: Result of percentage error rates for the up-down interface from the analytic 
study.
this chapter.
6.3 .1  C alibration  on real d ata
Log files were obtained from 60 syringe pumps in clinical use from the university 
hospital in Swansea. The log files were anonymous and contained no personal in­
formation. 30 numbers used as rate and volume settings were randomly sampled 
from the logs to inform the analytic analysis.All the numbers had a decimal part 
and ranged in value 0.26-83.3. A third of the selected numbers used had a precision 
of 2 decimal places. The same 30 numbers were used for both the lab study and the 
analytic trials.
6 .3 .2  Lab stu d y
In the lab study by Oladimeji et al. (2013), 33 participants (22 female) took part 
in the experiment. All participants experienced all the interfaces and the same 
numbers were entered on all the interfaces. Participants were trained on each UI 
before commencing trials on the interface. Ten numbers were used in a practice 
session and 20 were used in the experiment. The order in which the Uls and the 
numbers were encountered were randomised for all participants.
6.3 .3  A n a ly tic  s tu d y
For the analytic study, the implementation of the Stochastic Key Slip Simulation 
method introduced in chapter 3 is extended to accept a state machine described 
in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON). The model discovery method, developed by
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Gimblett and Thimbleby (2010), was ran on the number entry interfaces used in the 
lab study to generate a JSON state machine of each number entry interface. The 
SKSS implementation used these JSON models to ensure that the number entry 
interface models used in both the lab and analytic study were identical.
For each number entry state machine, each vertex represented every possible 
display of the number entry system and the arcs represented the transitions that 
happened after each button press. Therefore if, for example, in a keypad interface 
the display is currently showing Q , we are currently at the state named ‘0’ and if 
1 1 1 is pressed, the outgoing ‘1’ arc from the ‘0’ state takes us to the state named 
‘1’, therefore displaying Q .
In both the lab and analytic study, the number entry interfaces displayed num­
bers from 0 to 100 with accuracy of two decimal places. Representing number entry 
systems state machines in this way leads to large state machines. Even though each 
number entry interface had the same range and the same accuracy, the state ma­
chines are of different sizes: The number pad state machine has 11,204 states, the 
up-down machine has 10,001 states and the five-key machine has 50,005 states.
The five-key state machine is exactly five times the size of the up-down state 
machine. Both the five-key and up-down interfaces work by selecting which digit to 
edit and editing that particular digit using the up and down buttons. The difference 
between the two is that in the up-down interface, the user selects the digit to edit by 
selecting the correct button to press, while in the five-key interface, the user selects 
the digit using the left and right buttons that will highlight the selected digit. The 
key difference is that the five-key interface gives the user a visual cue of which digit 
is selected while the up-down interface relies on the user looking at the buttons. The 
state machine of a five-key interface will always be n times bigger than the state 
machine of an up-down interface where n is the number of digits displayed.
The state machine for the number pad is a different size than the up-down and 
the five-key. This is because the number-pad interface is a form of sequential number 
entry where the decimal point has to be input by the user, leaving the possibility 
of states with naked decimal points. This is not possible in up-down and five-key 
since both interfaces show a constant display width with unchanged digits at ‘O’.
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The SKSS method works by randomly generating N  pairs (a, 6), where N  is the 
number of tasks. A solver uses a strategy to generate a key sequence to go from a 
to b. Then for each key in that key sequence, with a probability p per keystroke 
a key slip is injected which is either (1) repetition, where a key is repeated, (2) 
substitution, where another key is entered erroneously, (3) transposition, where the 
sequence of two keys is transposed, or (4) deletion where pressing a key is omitted. 
After inserting the key slips using probability p, the resulting key sequence is used 
to simulate keying in that sequence on a design that starts from a display showing 
the number a. The resultant value is then compared to the original intended value 
b to find out whether the error is out by 10 or not.
For for this analytic study, SKSS was run with 105 number pairs for each UI 
and five times for each interface: in the first trial, all types of keying error (repe­
tition, deletion, substitution and transposition) were equally likely to happen; and 
in the rest of the trials the key slips were analysed individually to see how the 
type of key slip error contributed to the results. For this study, the solver found 
the actual shortest path in the JSON model between the input number and the 
intended number.
The keystroke error probability for SKSS was set to 0.01. In chapters 4 and 
5 of this thesis it is shown that the real-world empirical value of keystroke error 
probability does not matter, since a range of keystroke error probabilities were tried 
and the rankings for different designs did not change with the different probabilities.
The key sequences used to set the values on each interface are the shortest 
possible key sequence to input that value in each individual interface.
6.4 Results
Figure 6.3 shows a paired bar chart of the percentage of errors that occurred for 
each of the number entry interface styles, comparing the lab study results from 
(Oladimeji et al., 2013) and the analytic study from this present work.
In the lab study, the up-down interface had mostly out by 2 errors, less out by 
10 errors and no out by 100 errors. These proportions were the same in the analytic
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Laboratory results Analytic results
Out by 2 errors
Out by 10 errors
Out by 100 errors
Up-down
■ Number pad
■ Five key
6% 4% 2% 0 0 2% 4% 6%
Figure 6=3: Comparing laboratory and analytic results, showing out by 2, out by 10 
and out by 100 errors for each style o f  interface. The analytic results here are for the  
trial with each error occurring with equal probability.
E rro r O u t by 2 O ut by 10 O ut by 100
All e rro rs 58.2 35.8 6
D eletion 56.1 33.9 10
R ep e titio n 49.8 50.2 0
S u b stitu tio n 86.8 9.1 4.1
T ransposition 48.4 51.6 0
Table 6.2: Result o f  the percentage error rates for the number pad interface from the  
analytic study.
study but the percentage of errors in the analytic study were smaller for this type 
of interface. The up-down interface is the only interface that does not cause out 
by 100 errors in the analytic study. The reason for this becomes clear when we 
look at results from the other trials running each error category separately in the 
next sub-section.
The number pad does not have any out by 2 errors in the lab study but has 
few out by 10 and out by 100 errors. In the lab study, the number pad turned 
out to be the interface that causes high magnitude errors, the type that would be 
dangerous in the medical domain. In the analytic study, the number pad had errors 
of all magnitudes and from this study it is also the interface with the highest out
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Error Out by 2 Out by 10 Out by 100
All errors 69.7 29.2 1.1
D eletion 48.1 49.9 2.1
R epetition 100 0 0
Substitution 69.5 29.6 1
Transposition 99 1 0
Table 6.3: Result of the percentage errors for the five-key interface from the analytic 
study.
by 100 errors.
In the lab study, there were no errors at all for the five-key interface. In the 
analytic method, key-slip errors are injected with equal probability across all inter­
face styles. With the same error injection probability rates across designs, five-key 
interfaces have more errors than observed in the lab study. This is expected since 
errors were deliberately injected in the five-key trial.
The percentage error rates of the two types of studies are different. In the lab 
trial, there were no errors on the five-key interface. If the lab trial was run for a 
longer period of time, there would have been errors. The lab study shows that the 
error rates for the five-key interfaces are very low. Analytic methods can run trials 
that would take an unreasonably long time to do using lab trials, however, further 
work needs to be done to better inform the analytic methods with empirical results 
to simulate human behaviour more closely.
In the analytic results, each interface had highest out by 2 errors, followed by 
lower out by 10 errors, and out by 100 errors were the lowest for each interface. 
Although the five-key interface has higher out by 2 and out by 10 errors than the 
number pad, the number pad has higher out by 100 errors. In the lab study, the 
up-down interface had highest out by 2 errors, lower out by 10 errors and lowest out 
by 100 errors but the number pad had lowest out by 2 errors (none), highest out by 
10 errors and low out by 100 errors. The lab results indicate that the number pad is 
more likely to generate higher magnitude errors and the out by 100 errors observed 
in the analytic study confirm that number-pads should be avoided in safety critical 
number entry systems.
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6.4 .1  Error an alysis
This section now focusus on the analytic study to look at how each error type 
contributed to the results. This sort of analysis is difficult to do from a lab based 
study because error rates are very low.
Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 show percentage of errors that occurred for five-key, 
number pad and up-down interfaces when running five individual trials with 105 
numbers. These tables show how each error type (deletion, repetition, substitution 
and transposition) affect the result of all error types combined.
Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 show the ratios of out by 2, out by 10 and out by 100 
errors respectively between all interfaces for the five different trials.
The up-down interface does not have any out by 2, out by 10 or out by 100 
errors caused by deletion and transposition errors. Since the correct key sequence 
to enter any number in a trial is a sequence of [ a | buttons for each digit, deletion 
errors would be very small (less than out by 2). Transposition errors have a small 
probability of causing any error at all. If the hundreds digit is being incremented five 
times and one of those five keystrokes is transposed, this does not result in an error. 
A transposition error will only occur in the location in the key sequence where the 
two subsequent keys are different. In the case of the up-down interface this would 
be when one digit is set and the next digit is about to be set. Repetition errors in 
the up-down interface only cause errors of small magnitudes, and no out by 10 or 
out by 100 errors were detected. In general, this interface is less the least likely to 
cause high magnitude errors.
The number-pad interface has the most out by 100 error percentages for all 
types of errors. From the bar graph in figure 6.6 it is clear that the number pad 
consistently has a higher ratio of out by 100 error. The results from the analytic trial 
show that repetition errors do not cause any out by 100 errors in the number pad.
In five-key interfaces, repetition errors are very unlikely to cause high magnitude 
errors. The analytic results for repetition errors detected no out by 10 or out by 
100 errors. Transposition errors in this case are also much less likely to cause errors 
of high magnitude with 99% of transposition errors being out by 2 errors, 1% being 
out by 10 and no out by 100 errors. The cause for the errors in five-key interfaces
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being of lower magnitude in transposition and repetition errors is similar to what 
happens in up-down interfaces.
The error analysis presented here gives insight into why the analytic study pro­
duced the results it did. Up-down interfaces resulted in lower error rates because 
there are two types of errors (deletion and transposition) that do not generate any 
errors at all even in a trial simulating 105 number entry tasks. This interface designs 
out these two classes of error. Up-down interfaces also show that three types of er­
rors do not produce any out by 10 or out by 100 errors — that is, high magnitude 
errors. This is desirable in a safety critical domain where high magnitude number 
entry errors can be fatal.
6.5 Discussion
Safety critical number entry is prevalent in the medical domain. Infusion pumps that 
are commonly used in hospitals worldwide use a variety of the number entry systems 
studied in this chapter. The results from the previous lab study, that this current 
chapter makes comparisons to (Oladimeji et ah, 2013), suggest that number pads 
should not be used in hospitals. The results presented in this present chapter make 
an analytic argument to further substantiate the claims made using the lab study.
Figure 6.6 shows that in the analytic trial, the biggest percentage of out by 100 
errors are from the number pad interface. This is true for all five trials carried out. 
Errors of this magnitude would be fatal for most drugs administered, thus this style 
of interface should be avoided in medical device design.
Figure 6.4 is another graph drawn from the results in the analytic trial. Five-key 
interfaces are sensitive to substitution errors. This sensitivity can be reduced if the 
buttons on the device are designed to be far apart from each other, such as requiring 
two hands to input the number. The current implementation of SKSS does not take 
into consideration how far the buttons are on a device.
If the probability of the user making an error in an empirical experiment lasting 
t hours (including preparation, participant briefing, etc) is p , then the expected 
number of hours that experiments need to be performed to log at least one error is
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Number Pad
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All errors Deletion Repetition Substitution Transposition
Figure 6.4: Out by 2 error rates for each design in the five separate trials. All errors 
refers to  the trial that was run with th e  four error types occurring with equal probability 
while the rest o f the trials were run with only one error type being injected.
roughly tjp  (t and p may not be constant, etc). For a typical t — 1, p = 0.01, this 
time exceeds the working week, and practically one starts to have to run experiments 
over months or even years to get enough data to say statistically useful things. Seen 
like this, empirical experiments have limitations; in contrast, analytic methods can 
simulate a user by computer program and therefore be performed very fast and 
generate quantities of data for analysis. Interestingly, in experiments looking for 
design defects that may affect safety, the actual probabilities are not as interesting 
as designing to reduce them. We have found that our analysis methods suggest 
insightful design recommendations despite the uncertainties of real user performance 
data. Illustrating this argument, below, we will show how our analytic technique 
identified some design problems with a “5 key'’ user interface that had not been 
detected by empirical experiments.
In safety critical domains such as hospitals, human error eventually happens. It 
is our aim to reduce the harm caused by human error, when it does occur. Even 
a well-designed lab study may not be able to sample all the errors that will occur 
during use for each interface. For example, during the lab study the five-key interface
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Figure 6.5: Out by 10 error rates for each design in the five separate trials. All errors 
refers to  the trial that was run with the four error types occurring with equal probability 
while the rest of the trials were run with only one error type being injected.
and number pad did not show any out by 2 errors; an implausible result. In general, 
it is not feasible to run a lab study for a long enough time, analytic studies can 
be used in complement to explore the bigger picture, instead of assuming that the 
interface design is error free.
6 . 5 . 1  D i f f e r e n c e s  i n  r e s u l t s
The version of SKSS reported in this chapter simulates key slips in a user’s task with 
equal probability and SKSS simulates the task many more times than is feasible in 
a typical user study. Consequently and generally, the number of reported errors is 
a lot more in the analytical study than the lab study.
Analytic studies are important in the design process for engineering out error. 
By design, key slip errors due to repetition and transposition of keys are less severe 
on the up-down interface. Consequently from the SKSS analyses, most of the errors 
on the up-down interfaces were out by 2 errors. Empirical results complement this 
method. The low number of out by 10 errors on the up-down interface highlights 
a current limitation in the key slip injection mechanism used in the analytic study
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Figure 6.6: Out by 100 error rates for each design in the five separate trials. All 
errors refers to  the trial that was run with the four error types occurring with equal 
probability while the rest o f  the trials were run with only one error type being injected.
that is currently not as sophisticated as some of the errors that were manifest in 
the lab study. For example, on the up-down interface, some users made out by 
ten errors because they shifted the place values of the digits to be entered. One 
user entered 1.11 instead of 11.1 (Oladimeji et al., 2013). This means that SKSS 
is currently only reporting a certain class of fundamental key slip errors but misses 
out cognitive errors that users make when using devices. This reiterates the point 
in this methodology about iterative evaluation; modelling cognitive-type errors in 
SKSS based on user behaviour from lab studies would enhance the method to cover 
more types of error.
In modelling both up-down and five-key number entry systems we see that con­
ceptually, the only difference between them is that five-key uses a visual cue on 
the display while the up-down interface does not. From an eye tracking lab study 
reported by Oladimeji, Thimbleby, and Cox (2011), interfaces where users looked at 
the display while entering numbers led to fewer undetected errors. Currently, SKSS 
does not account for the differences in undetected error rates that are as a result 
of differences in interface design. The cursor based design of the five-key interface
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requires a level of user attention on the screen. This implies that users are probably 
more likely to notice errors on this interface than on the numeric keypad interface. 
An improvement on the SKSS method would vary the probability of error based on 
user interfaces to account for the possible differences in error detection rates, which 
can only be found out empirically.
6.6 Conclusions
Number entry user interface design can be improved by triangulating empirical and 
analytic methods for evaluation. Three types of number entry systems were used in 
this study: the number pad, up-down, and five-key interfaces. A SKSS implemen­
tation was calibrated with a large hospital data set and applied to three different 
styles of interfaces. The results were then compared to previous empirical results 
presented in (Oladimeji et ah, 2013).
The coverage of an analytical method, such as SKSS as used here, can be far more 
exhaustive than the small sample of errors that can be studied in a user experiment. 
Conversely, the types of real user errors occurring in the lab are more complex than 
those currently modelled using analytical methods.
Such insights will help improve future versions of the analytic methods, especially 
with respect to typical user error types. Empirical methods help in making sure that 
users understand the different designs while analytical methods help in designing the 
fine details of the systems that are essential in critical design such as those of medical 
devices. The approaches are complementary: while research papers might contribute 
research to either approach exclusively, real design — particularly safety critical UI 
design — requires both.
HCI contributions lie on a spectrum from practice to research. For research, 
this chapter shows both analytic and empirical methods need developing, together, 
to more reliably understand safety critical design issues. For practical system de­
velopment — where we wish to improve a particular design rather than uncover 
underlying design principles — the main insight is that designing number entry sys­
tems by using both types of analysis methods is essential, and while neither method
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is perfect, the combination of methods raises critical questions that will need to be 
addressed in further development.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions & further work
Skilled users make slips. As far as possible, interactive systems should be designed 
to detect and help users manage as many slips as possible to help avoid slips turning 
into errors that lead to adverse situations. In the medical domain — where entering 
drug doses into interactive medical devices is safety critical — we wish to reduce 
the number of drug over and under doses. This thesis has shown that even such 
“simple” user interfaces have a variety of subtle design choices that can be used 
in combination to make a significant difference to their sensitivity to user error. 
In particular, this thesis recommends that user interfaces attem pt to block user 
error (e.g., beeping or otherwise reporting detectable errors to the user, rather than 
ignoring them — as is common practice). This and other recommendations are 
based on a very diverse set of formal simulations, and thus are independent of the 
usual implicit design assumptions. These are significant results that can lead to 
practical applications in real, safety critical environments.
Differential formal analysis is a new methodology that should be used to comple­
ment user trials for more rigorous evaluation of safety critical number entry systems. 
Subtle interaction design choices in number entry lead to drastically different out­
comes; it is crucial that these choices are explored and that a design that is more 
resilient to human error is implemented. More broadly, the Differential formal anal­
ysis process leads to important discussions about empirical questions about how 
practitioners use number entry systems in practice.
Logs from 19 medical infusion pumps that were used for three years in a UK
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hospital were collected and analysed to answer some of the empirical questions 
raised by the differential formal analysis process. An analysis was carried out on the 
numbers that were infused; on the noticed errors that were detectable from the logs; 
and on the strategies that practitioners used to input numbers. One outcome from 
this analysis is that medical device logs can be a rich source of data and they can 
be improved to make usability analyses better. Chapter 5 makes the results from 
the differential formal analysis process domain specific to medical device design.
A wider view on number entry design was taken in chapter 6. This chapter served 
to generalise the differential formal analysis process to number entry systems other 
than 5-key number entry systems and also to compare results to a lab study carried 
out on the same number entry systems. This chapter highlights the importance of 
using both analytical and empirical techniques in safety critical design. Empirical 
techniques are important to design systems that are resilient to human error. Even­
tually, safety critical systems are refined to reduce human error to be undetectable 
in user studies. It is important to have an analytic tool that is calibrated with the 
real world to further refine the system in order to further reduce harm caused by 
human error.
7.1 Further work
This thesis has shown that safety critical number entry research is important, this 
section outlines further work to carry on the important area of research.
7.1.1 Further em pirical and  an alytic  itera tion s
Differential Formal Analysis is a method that exposes empirical questions such as: 
how do users enter numbers? Medical device logs have been analysed to uncover 
possible strategies that users take when inputting numbers. The results from the 
log analysis have been used in the differential formal analysis process to see how the 
various real world strategies effect the simulated results.
In the method of differential formal analysis, there are two types of empirical 
questions raised.
• Those that can use the differential formal analysis process to find out whether 
they matter or not.
• Those that the differential formal analysis process cannot find out whether 
they m atter or not. In this case, it is worthwhile carrying out the empirical 
studies to further inform the differential formal analysis process.
For the first type of study a stochastic experiment can be designed to see whether 
the results change depending on the empirical outcomes. A good example of this 
is demonstrated in this thesis in chapter 4 where the question of whether the error 
probability rate of entering numbers matters is answered. For the experiment in 
chapter 4, SKSS trials with varying probabilities were run. The results from these 
trials showed that the design rankings did not change depending on the error prob­
ability, therefore finding out the actual value of the error probability is unnecessary.
A question that cannot be answered through Differential Formal Analysis is 
whether users understand the particular features that are studied. In this thesis, 
reasonable features that are found in real world devices have been analysed, how­
ever, studying whether the features are understandable by users is an important 
issue. The arithmetic feature proves to be a good feature to have through this type 
of analysis, however, an empirical study should be carried out into whether users 
understand features, such as arithmetic. This is an important study since if a design 
is not understood by users, this would increase the probability of users making slips. 
This thesis shows how designs rank when the same error probabilities are applied, 
however the error probabilities might in reality be different in different designs.
7 .1 .2  Transfer errors
Chapter 4 shows that there are various ways of implementing five-key number entry 
systems. The various designs are made up of combinations of features described in 
the chapter: cursor starting position; digit wraparound; cursor wraparound; arith­
metic; and block errors. Chapter 4 provides results of what design -  made up of a 
combination of features -  reduces the harm caused by human error.
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Given that the best implementation of a 5-key interface is found, upgrading med­
ical devices in hospitals to software versions that implement the best implementation 
might result in “transfer errors. ” A transfer error occurs if a clinician uses a key 
sequence that results in the intended value on one number entry system implemen­
tation but a different value on a system upgrade or different medical device.
SKSS can be used to find the harm caused by transfer errors between the different 
number entry designs. When upgrading software versions, it is critical to consider 
the harm cause by transfer errors and upgrade systems accordingly.
7.1 .3  Im proving  m ed ical d ev ice  logs
Currently, medical device logs are not detailed enough to perform some types of 
usability analyses. More accurate logging of how clinicians interact with medical 
devices would give invaluable interaction design insight. Infusion pump log files from 
three different manufacturers show that limited keystrokes are logged, timestamps 
are sometimes coarsely grained, and events are difficult to match. Better logging to 
enable better usability studies and better incident investigations are necessary.
7.1 .4  C ontin uou s num ber en try  sy stem s
In chapter 6, the SKSS method was extended to analyse more number entry systems 
that were studied empirically by Oladimeji et al. (2013).
There are types of number entry systems -  continuous number entry systems 
-  that are not currently evaluated by SKSS. As future work, one should explore 
reducing the harm caused by human error on these types of number entry systems.
7.1 .5  B e tte r  m od ellin g  o f  hum an error
Prom the comparison of the analytic analysis to the empirical analysis in chapter 
6, it was found that some errors that were made in the empirical study were not 
modelled in the analytic study.
More iterations on the study carried out in chapter 6 should be carried out in 
order to improve the results.
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The current SKSS implementation, models slip errors, however there are more 
types of errors that are made by people that can be modelled to be included in the 
analytic technique used in this thesis.
Cognitive errors are one type of errors that have been seen in the empirical 
trial. For example, in the Up-Down interface, if the number 10 is to be entered, 
a person might place their hand on a button further to the left than intended. 
The result would be a display showing 100, rather than 10. In the current imple­
mentation of the SKSS method this type of error might occur, as two substitution 
errors (by the same button) in succession. In the current implementation, this 
sort of error is less likely to happen, therefore better human error modelling would 
improve the analytic technique.
Another aspect of human error that is not considered in this thesis are errors 
caused from environmental aspects such as distractions. It is currently unknown 
how these environmental factors contribute to number entry error.
7 .1 .6  Im proved  p hysica l d esign s and hardw are m od ellin g
This thesis analyses number entry systems found in infusion pumps that are cur­
rently on the market. With the improvement of electronics, and accessibility and 
lower cost of new hardware -  such as touch screens -  important further work is 
designing better hardware layouts for safety critical design.
The current implementation of SKSS does not consider the physical layout of 
the device. In a device that has a button layout where the [ < \ and [ ► 1 are far 
apart -  possibly far enough apart for the [ < | button to be keyed with the left hand 
and the [ ► | to be keyed with the right hand -  it is less likely to have a substitution 
error where the [ ► | key is substituted with the [ < \ key.
Touchscreens bring in a wide range of possibilities for number entry design. There 
are various graphical number entry techniques that can be implemented on touch­
screens that can be designed to reduce harm caused by human error. Touchscreens 
have not been evaluated in medical settings, however, there are scenarios where they 
might not be practical, such as in a device used on a search and rescue helicopter 
where the environment might cause error when interacting with a touchscreen.
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7 .1 .7  D a ta  en try
This thesis has mainly focussed on safety critical number entry interfaces. Data 
entry as a whole has not been explored.
Primarily, when entering drug doses into infusion pumps, three parameters are 
input: (i) the volum e of the fluid being infused; (ii) the ra te  of infusion and (iii) 
the tim e  (or duration) of the infusion. These three parameters are used together 
where Volume =  Rate x Time.
In some commercial infusion pumps, two of these values are required as input 
and the third value is calculated. In order to reduce error, one might explore a 
system where the three values are input and then checked automatically by the 
pump’s software to make sure that the three values obey the formula of Volume =  
Rate x Tim e. One might find errors in this way and alert the user to input the 
values again.
Beyond number entry, data also comes in the form of text. The research meth­
ods presented should be explored to analyse text entry. This would be useful in 
safety critical domains as well as for commercial products, such as mobile phone 
touchscreen keypads.
7.2 Conclusions
This thesis shows that the problems with number entry systems design are important 
to address. In safety critical scenarios such as busy hospital wards, better number 
entry systems design can prevent unnecessary adverse events which could be fatal. 
It is important to choose the hardware layout that is more resilient to human error, 
and further than that, it is important to choose the best interaction (program code) 
design for the specific hardware layout.
This thesis presents an analytical and evidence based method that can help 
improve medical devices. It is important for number entry systems that look the 
same, to behave in the same way. The method presented in this thesis should be used 
to find the design that is more resilient to human error and regulatory bodies should 
enforce a standardisation on the interaction design of number entry systems that
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employ the same hardware layout. This would reduce unnecessary adverse events.
The work in this thesis shows that we can begin to solve the problems in medical 
device design. The further work outlined in this chapter shows that this is a good 
start for a research program that extends this work to make medical device design 
more reliable.
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